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THE LEGACY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S APPROACH TO
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
JULIA L. ERNST*

ABSTRACT
This Article explores how Theodore Roosevelt viewed the structure of
government within the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s. It
particularly considers his standpoints on the interrelationships between the
three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—at both
the federal and state levels. More specifically, it investigates Roosevelt’s
perspectives on presidential use of executive orders to take action in the
face of Congressional inertia in the federal government. Considering state
governments, it examines his views in favor of restricting the independence
of the judiciary. The Article suggests that, while Theodore Roosevelt’s
approach to the judiciary has not been followed, he helped set the stage for
the active use of executive orders in shaping the federal laws, which has
substantially influenced the relationship between the president and
Congress. Whether or not one agrees with presidential use of executive
orders to effectuate major legal and policy changes, Roosevelt’s legacy in
originating the extensive use of this practice remains significant today.

* Associate Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law; LL.M., Georgetown
University Law Center; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law; M.A., University of
Michigan Rackham School of Graduate Studies; B.A., Yale University.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article arose out of a symposium on President Roosevelt, hosted
by the Theodore Roosevelt Center at Dickinson State University, at which I
was invited to speak.1 Therefore, it may read more like an oral presentation
for a largely non-legal audience than a traditional law review article. Every
year, the Theodore Roosevelt Center in western North Dakota hosts a
symposium exploring various issues related to our former president.2 One

1. I would like to give a special thanks to Anne Mostad-Jensen, one of our outstanding law
librarians at the University of North Dakota School of Law, for her expert research in helping me
prepare for this presentation. My Burtness Scholar Research Assistants, Calley Campbell and
Thaddeus Swanson, provided additional invaluable support in conducting research for the
presentation and this Article.
2. See Events, THEODORE ROOSEVELT CTR., http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/en
/Get-Involved/Events.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2017). Each year, the Theodore Roosevelt Center
hosts a symposium exploring various issues related to our former president, such as the one in the
fall of 2016 addressing Theodore Roosevelt and the 1912 election. Moreover, Dickinson State
University has been selected to house the nation’s Theodore Roosevelt Presidential Library,
containing a museum as well as public access to both digital and print libraries. Currently only
thirteen presidential libraries exist across the United States, so the Theodore Roosevelt
Presidential Library would be the fourteenth, which will be a wonderful centerpiece for North
Dakota.
Board approves system budget request, N.D. UNIV. SYS. (Jun. 28, 2016),

2017]

THE LEGACY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S APPROACH

311

might ask, why is the center located in North Dakota? Why was it not
established in New York, where Roosevelt was born, became New York
City Police Commissioner, served in the New York Legislative Assembly,
was elected as Governor of the state, and is buried? In response to these
questions, it is important to recall that as a relatively young man, Theodore
Roosevelt spent several years (cumulatively) living in the Badlands region
of the western part of North Dakota, in part while he was recovering from
the death of his wife and mother—both on the same day—on February 14,
1884.3 He subsequently attributed his tremendous success in politics—and
particularly his ascendency to the presidency—to the time that he spent in
North Dakota, saying “I never would have been President if it had not been
for my experiences in North Dakota.”4 We North Dakotans are very proud
of this fact and have claimed Theodore Roosevelt as one of our own.
Therefore, the Theodore Roosevelt Center was founded in North Dakota
and holds an annual conference commemorating the president’s
contributions to our region and our nation.5
In September 2015, the symposium focused on “Theodore Roosevelt
and the Law.”6 Clay Jenkinson, the director of the Center, asked me to give
a presentation delving into issues relating to Theodore Roosevelt and the
U.S. Constitution, particularly investigating his perspectives on presidential
use of executive orders and on the independence of the judiciary.7 This

http://blog.ndus.edu/2699/board-approves-system-budget-request/#sthash.0cLSDTEn.
M3RlHRjR.dpbs.
3. Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Zeal: Teddy Roosevelt’s Life and Writing, 10 LEGAL COMM.
& RHETORIC: JALWD 125, 131 (2013).
4. Theodore Roosevelt National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/
presidents/t_roosevelt_park.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
5. I was delighted to participate in this event, as I had heard about the symposium for years
but had not had an opportunity previously to attend. I learned a great deal about other aspects of
Roosevelt’s life and influence on the law from the other speakers. For example, Professor Kermit
Roosevelt, III provided a fascinating keynote speech addressing additional aspects regarding
Theodore Roosevelt and the Constitution. I would encourage anyone who is interested in this era
of our nation’s history to attend the symposium in the future. The theme for the symposium in
September/October 2016 was Theodore Roosevelt: Candidate in the Arena. Symposia,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT CTR., http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/en/Get-Involved/Events/
Archive/Symposia.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
6. Id.
7. I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to Clay Jenkinson for the opportunity to give
this presentation and subsequently to publish an expanded version of my remarks as this Article.
Many of the concepts developed in this Article arose from the dialogue that I had with Mr.
Jenkinson during the question and answer segment of my presentation at the symposium, for
which I am very grateful to him. I also want to thank Shannon Patterson for her kind introduction
to my presentation. Shannon was a senior at Dickinson State University majoring in psychology
and minoring in leadership studies. She was in her fourth year as a Theodore Roosevelt Scholar
and her second year as Vice President of the Theodore Roosevelt Honors Program’s Executive
Committee.
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Article arises out of that presentation and explores how Roosevelt viewed
the structure of government in the United States (“U.S.”) during the late
1800s and early 1900s. In particular, this Article examines how he
perceived the checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government. It explores Roosevelt’s use of executive
orders to create sweeping policy changes when he felt that Congress was
neglecting its duties to address issues of national significance.
Furthermore, it delves into his attacks on judicial independence, such as
when he deemed that the courts were erecting reactionary roadblocks to
progressive legislation. Roosevelt’s aspirations regarding the courts
thankfully largely failed. However, he has left an enduring legacy
regarding presidential use of executive orders that remains to this day.
Whether or not one agrees with presidential use of executive orders to
effectuate major legal and policy changes, Roosevelt’s legacy in originating
the extensive use of this practice remains significant today.
II. ROOSEVELT’S EXPANSION OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS
A central aspect of Theodore Roosevelt’s approach to governmental
powers that has continuing repercussions is the use of executive authority in
the face of Congressional inaction, and particularly his unprecedented and
extensive use of executive orders.8 An executive order is a directive issued
by a president requiring an agency or official within the executive branch of
the federal government to take certain actions.9 Roosevelt was the first
president significantly to expand the use of executive orders and other
actions as mechanisms enabling the federal government to take action on

8. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 420 (1985 ed.
1913) (while discussing “[t]he idea that the Executive is the steward of public welfare,” Roosevelt
indicated that “[t[he laws were often insufficient, and it became well nigh impossible to get them
amended in the public interest when once the representatives of privilege in Congress grasped the
fact that I would sign no amendment that contained anything not in the public interest. It was
necessary to use what law was already in existence, and then further to supplement it by Executive
action.”).
9. William D. Neighbors, Comment, Presidential Legislation by Executive Order, 37 U.
COLO. L. REV. 105, 106 (1964).
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important issues.10 He issued an average of over 140 executive orders per
year, and by the end of his term in office had delivered 1081.11
A. HISTORICAL USE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Of course, executive orders have been used by nearly all Presidents
throughout the course of our nation’s history, including by Presidents who
helped establish the country and its government. For example, the very first
President, George Washington, issued eight of them.12 James Madison also
issued one during his term as the fourth president of the United States.13
Because Washington and Madison both signed the U.S. Constitution, they
were very familiar with the limitations that the U.S. Constitution placed on
the presidency. Presumably they felt that the U.S. Constitution did not
forbid them from taking this action while they served as President, even
though they used executive orders very sparingly. John Adams, who served
as the second President, issued one, and Thomas Jefferson, the third
President, issued four.14 One of Jefferson’s actions that was not initially
termed an executive order but has been deemed so subsequently is the
Louisiana Purchase in 1803.15 This action vastly expanded the territory of
the nation, and it was only after the fact that Congress authorized the funds
for the purchase.
Although Presidents have issued executive orders since the very
founding of our country, their use was not extensive early on in our
country’s history. Presidents issued fewer than twenty executive orders
throughout their terms in office up until the 1850s.16 William Henry
Harrison, the ninth President, is the only one who did not issue an executive
order.17 However, Harrison died of complications from pneumonia on his
thirty-second day in office, serving the shortest tenure in United States
10. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 479
(Stating that “occasionally great national crises arise which call for immediate and vigorous
executive action, and . . . in such cases it is the duty of the President to act upon the theory that he
is the steward of the people, and that the proper attitude for him to take is that he is bound to
assume that he has the legal right to do whatever the needs of the people demand, unless the
Constitution or the laws explicitly forbid him to do it.”).
11. Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Executive Orders, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, eds., Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
data/orders.php.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in ModernDay America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 37 (2002); see generally Neighbors, supra note 9, at 106 (“Jefferson
purchased the Louisiana Territory from France without any prior authority from Congress.”).
16. Peters & Woolley, supra note 11.
17. Id.
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presidential history, from March 4 through April 4, 1841; therefore, he did
not have much time to do anything while in office.
Presidential use of executive orders gradually became more popular in
the latter part of the 1800s. For example, Ulysses S. Grant issued 217
between 1869 and 1877.18 Grover Cleveland issued over 250 during his
two non-consecutive terms in office in the late 1800s.19 And immediately
preceding Roosevelt, President William McKinley did not shy away from
using executive orders, issuing 185 of them, for an average of over forty per
year.20 Thus, significant precedent for using executive orders existed prior
to President Roosevelt, but not nearly as many compared to his average of
140 per year. Moreover, most of the early executive orders dealt mainly
with administrative issues.21 During this early era in our nation’s history
reigned a great suspicion of executive authority, so presidents were
conscientiously circumspect in their use of executive power. Certain
exceptions arose, of course, such as Thomas Jefferson’s action doubling the
size of the nation with the stroke of his pen through the Louisiana
Purchase.22 Not until Abraham Lincoln issued executive orders in the
1860s—such as the Emancipation Proclamation freeing the slaves in the
secessionist states,23 and another suspending the writ of habeas corpus24—
did executive orders frequently because used for more substantive matters.
In a dramatic departure from previous presidents, at the beginning of
the Twentieth Century, Roosevelt became a champion for the unabashed
use of substantive executive orders to make sweeping changes in law and
policy, at times over the objections of the other branches of government.
During his term between 1901 and 1909, he issued over 1000 executive

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Branum, supra note 15, at 5 (“Originally, executive orders and other directives were
used primarily as administrative tools.”).
22. Alissa C. Wetzel, Beyond the Zone of Twilight: How Congress and the Court Can
Minimize the Dangers and Maximize the Benefits of Executive Orders, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 385,
392-93 (2007) (explaining that “two important executive orders were issued prior to the Civil
War. First, though seldom classified as such, President Thomas Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase
had all the markings of an executive order, since it was done unilaterally by Presidential order
without direct statutory or Constitutional authority. Significantly, neither Congress nor the public
challenged the Louisiana Purchase on the grounds that it was issued without Congressional
authority.”) (citations omitted).
23. Branum, supra note 15, at 37.
24. Emanuel Margolis, National Security and the Constitution: A Titanic Collision, 81
CONN. B.J. 271, 276; see Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. CASES 144 (Cir. Ct. Md. 1861) (holding that
Congress alone was authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and that President Lincoln’s
executive order was therefore unconstitutional).

2017]

THE LEGACY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S APPROACH

315

orders—864 more than any previous president.25 His aggressive use of this
presidential power emboldened subsequent Presidents to follow suit. For
example, William Howard Taft, who immediately succeeded Roosevelt,
issued 724 during his single term in office between 1909 and 1913.26 Taft
was a lawyer by training and had served as an assistant prosecutor, as a
state superior court judge, as the Solicitor General of the United States, and
as a federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.27
Therefore, he would have been very familiar with constitutional powers and
constraints. His actions demonstrate that he did not feel that the U.S.
Constitution prohibited the president from issuing executive orders.
Woodrow Wilson issued 1803 of them during his two terms in office
between 1913 and 1921, during and following World War I.28 Although
serving as president for less than two and one half years, William Harding
issued a total of 522 executive orders.29 Calvin Coolidge issued 1203, and
Herbert Hoover issued 968.30 Theodore Roosevelt’s younger cousin,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, exceeded him by over 2500, putting into place
3721 executive orders during the New Deal era.31
From that high water mark, the use of executive orders has gradually
tapered off to a certain extent. For example, Harry S. Truman dropped the
number of executive orders down to 907, and the use of executive orders
again plummeted under Dwight D. Eisenhower to only 484.32 Since that
time, Presidents have issued fewer than 400. For example, George W. Bush
issued 291, and Barack Obama had issued 276 by the end of his
presidency.33
B. THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S INCREASING USE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Examining the trajectory of presidential use of executive orders
throughout the course of our nation’s history puts Roosevelt’s actions into a
historical context. Although he was by no means the first to use executive
orders, he was certainly a pioneer in emphasizing their use, greatly

25. Peters & Woolley, supra note 11.
26. Id.
27. Stephen E. Hessler, The Story of Benjamin Cardozo, Learned Hand & the Southern
District of New York, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 191, 212 (2003); Donald F. Anderson, Building
National Consensus: The Career of William Howard Taft, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 323, 325-26 (2000).
28. Peters & Woolley, supra note 11.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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expanding the powers of the presidency in doing so.34 In part, he wanted to
use this mechanism because he felt that if Congress was not acting when he
believed it should—if the federal government was not taking steps to
address a particular issue that Roosevelt thought was in the national
interest—he surmised that he, as president, would need to take that power
himself to resolve the problem. As one mechanism for circumventing
Congressional inaction, he would issue an executive order to ensure that the
problem was addressed. For example, consider conservation of the natural
environment.35
By way of background, before he became President, Roosevelt’s
activities during the late 1800s—including his activities right here in North
Dakota—placed him very well to lead the charge highlighting the plight of
wildlife, fish, forests, and other natural resources from throughout the
country.36 Of course, he had been a first-hand witness to the devastation of
the bison that had occurred in the Dakotas and surrounding regions.37 At
one point he wrote: “The extermination of the buffalo has been a veritable
tragedy of the animal world.”38 While he served as Governor of New York,
he developed a concern for forest lands.39 During the late 1800s, the nation
also observed the increasing destruction of the migratory bird population

34. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 434-35
(“During the seven and a half years closing on March 4, 1909 [his last day in office], more was
accomplished for the protection of wild life in the United States than during all of the previous
years, excepting only the creation of the Yellowstone National Park.”).
35. Roosevelt was adamant about protecting the natural environment for future generations.
See, e.g., EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 500 (Random House 2001) (“He repeated what he
had said . . . about the gravity of the responsibility Americans had to pass on to their children a
protected natural heritage.”).
36. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 299. As
governor of New York, “I was able to do a good deal for forest preservation and the protection of
our wild life. All that I later strove for in the Nation in connection with Conservation was
foreshadowed by what I was able to obtain for New York State when I was Governor.” Id.
Indeed, since his early childhood, he had always had an affinity for nature. See PAUL RUSSELL
CUTRIGHT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE MAKING OF A CONSERVATIONIST 1-13, 212 (1985)
(“No other president—before or since—has been so well prepared for the task of inaugurating and
implementing a comprehensive, aggressive, nationwide conservation program.”).
37. CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 161 (“[A]bove all else, he had been spectator to the rapid,
remorseless destruction of the buffalo and other game animals, this causing him to cry out, ‘The
frontier has come to an end, it has vanished.’”).
38. Oseid, supra note 3, at 131, 140 (“Gone forever are the mighty herds of the lordly
buffalo. A few solitary individuals and small bands are still to be found scattered here and there in
the wilder parts of the plains . . . but the great herds . . . have vanished forever. The extermination
of the buffalo has been a veritable tragedy of the animal world.”).
39. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 408 (“Like
other men who had thought about the national future at all, I had been growing more and more
concerned over the destruction of the forests.”); see also CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 199-207.
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through hunting for their plumes, particularly in Florida.40 Many had also
raised concern over the severe reduction in the population of other species,
such as the passenger pigeon that had once been abundant.41 Moreover,
public support was continually increasing for more vigorous action on the
part of the federal government to reverse some of these negative trends.
Toward the end of the Nineteenth Century, as a result of increasing
awareness of the devastation that was happening to the environment, and
particularly that was happening to fish and wildlife, the federal government
created the Federal Office for the Commission of Fisheries42 and the
Division of Economic Ornithology and Mammalogy, which later became
the Department of Agriculture.43 These entities helped the nation gain
better information about the damage to wildlife occurring throughout the
country.44 From the studies that these agencies performed, it became very
apparent that vast federal resources—and more specifically, the country’s
natural resources—were in significant jeopardy.45 Around this timeframe,
sportsman’s groups and conservation organizations began to lobby
Congress, urging it to do something to alleviate these harms.46 For
example, Roosevelt and numerous influential colleagues, including

40. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 436
(noting “the ruthless destruction of plume birds for the millinery trade”); see also CUTRIGHT,
supra note 36, at 223.
41. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 691-92 (2005)
(“The fate of the passenger pigeon vividly illustrates how early non-regulation of market hunting
played out. At the time of America’s discovery, passenger pigeons ranged from the Atlantic Coast
westward to the Rocky Mountains; their numbers were estimated in the billions. . . . By the mid1800s, this excessive hunting resulted in a marked reduction of passenger pigeons. But most
Americans refused to believe that the once bountiful species was in danger of extinction. . . . A
victim of America’s pro-capture mindset, the last wild passenger pigeon was shot in September of
1908, and the last captive bird died in a Cincinnati zoo on September 1, 1914.”).
42. USFWS History, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE (Mar. 7, 2014), https://training.fws.
gov/history/USFWS-history.html.
43. Origins of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE (Feb. 21,
2014), https://training.fws.gov/history/TimelinesOrigins.html; see also History and Organization,
USGS PATUXENT WILDLIFE RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 1, 2011), https://www.pwrc.usgs.gov/
history/bsphist2.htm.
44. Sandra B. Zellmer, Wilderness Management in National Parks and Wildlife Refuges, 44
ENVTL. L. 497, 512-13 (2014) (“The FWS [Fish and Wildlife Service] traces its origins back to
1871, when Congress created the United States Commission on Fish and Fisheries in the
Department of Commerce to study population declines of fish species harvested for food. It also
has roots in the Division of Economic Ornithology and Mammalogy, created in 1885 in the
Department of Agriculture to study the effects of birds in controlling agricultural pests and to
track the geographical distribution of animal and plant species throughout the country.”) (citations
omitted).
45. Origins of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 43; see also History and
Organization, supra note 43.
46. Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of
American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 540 n.123 (2003).
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renowned figures in government, scientists, authors, and others, founded an
organization in 1887 called the Boone and Crockett Club, named after early
explorers and national icons Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett.47 Roosevelt
became a prominent leader in this alliance.48
Despite growing public support for preserving natural resources,
Congress would not budge. When Congress did not act to protect wildlife,
Roosevelt became impatient. He did not want to wait until Congress
responded, if indeed it ever would. As public concern increased, Roosevelt
was exceedingly aware of the urgent necessity to manage natural resources
more effectively and was at the forefront of the efforts to stem the losses of
natural resources and the harms to the environment.49 Thus, when he
became president in 1901 following the assassination of President William
McKinley, the conservation-minded Roosevelt was aptly situated to take on
the daunting problem of protecting the United States’ natural resources.50
The following year, Roosevelt supported members of the Boone and
Crockett Club in cultivating a proposal to establish a national network of
wildlife refuges to help alleviate those problems.51 As the initial step in
implementing this plan, President Roosevelt issued the very first executive
order establishing a national wildlife refuge, in this instance, to preserve the
habitat of the brown pelican and other types of birds.52 This order led to the
creation of the Pelican Island National Wildlife Refuge along Florida’s
Atlantic coast, a move that was also supported by the Florida Audubon
Society.53 This was the earliest federal land specifically set apart to ensure
47. 125-year Snapshot: Boone and Crocket Club 1887-2012, BOONE AND CROCKETT CLUB,
http://www.boone-crockett.org/about/about_overview.asp?area=about (last visited Feb. 17, 2017);
see also Thomas Lund, Nineteenth Century Wildlife Law: A Case Study of Elite Influence, 33
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 935, 945 (2001); see also Devin Kenney, A Goat Too Far?: State Authority To
Translocate Species On And Off (And Around) Federal Land, 8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 303, 312 (2015-2016); see also CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 167 (“In 1887 he and
George Bird Grinnell took the first steps in forming the Boone and Crockett Club”); see also id. at
168-69.
48. Lund, supra note 47, at 945 (“When Theodore Roosevelt became President, Stewart
Udall has pointed out, ‘the Boone and Crockett wildlife creed . . . became national policy.’”).
49. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 422 (“The
Conservation movement was a direct outgrowth of the forest movement. It was nothing more than
the application to our other natural resources of the principles which had been worked out in
connection with the forests. Without the basis of public sentiment which had been built up for the
protection of the forests, and without the example of public foresight in the protection of this, one
of the greatest natural resources, the Conservation movement would have been impossible.”).
50. Id. at 409.
51. 125-year Snapshot: Boone and Crocket Club 1887-2012, supra note 47.
52. CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 233.
53. Pelican Island: History, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE (Oct. 14, 2015),
https://www.fws.gov/refuge/pelican_island/about/history.html; see also J. Michael Scott et al.,
National Wildlife Refuge System: Ecological Context and Integrity, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1041,
1042 (2004).
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the survival of a particular species. Immensely enjoying his power,
President Roosevelt “indeed delights in every aspect of his job: . . . in
setting aside millions of acres of unspoiled land at the stroke of a pen (‘Is
there any law that will prevent me from declaring Pelican Island a Federal
Bird Reservation? . . . Very well, then I so declare it!’).”54
This may seem like an insignificant initiative by itself, yet it was only
the beginning of a major program developing a nationwide network of
ecological preserves. In the wake of this modest beginning at Pelican
Island, Roosevelt issued a total of fifty-one executive orders to set aside
federal lands for the protection of wild birds across seventeen states, as well
as three territories.55 He also issued other executive orders advancing
conservation initiatives.56 Responding to Roosevelt’s leadership and to
public sentiment, Congress finally started to acquiesce. For example, it
established the first game preserves in the country in 1905—the Wichita
Game Preserves.57 It passed the National Monuments Act in 1906—
preserving such icons as the Muir Woods in California and the Mount
Olympus National Monument in Washington.58 It also created the National
Bison Range in Montana in 1908.59 Currently, the National Wildlife
Refuge System covers almost 94 million acres spread across more than 500
refuges, in addition to several thousand waterfowl production areas.60
Roosevelt also urged the creation of five additional national parks,
including Sully Hill National Park near Devil’s Lake in North Dakota,
which doubled the total number of national parks in the country.61

54. EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 17 (Coward, McCann &
Geoghegan, Inc., 1979).
55. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 436; see
also CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 223.
56. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 424 (“The
task of [the National Conservation Commission] was to prepare an inventory, the first ever made
for any nation, of all the natural resources which underlay its property. The making of this
inventory was made possible by an Executive order which placed the resources of the Government
Departments at the command of the Commission.”).
57. Id. at 435.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 436.
60. America’s National Wildlife Refuge System, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
https://www.fws.gov/refuges100/facts/wpas.html.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (“Nearly 95
percent of waterfowl production areas are located in the prairie wetlands or ‘potholes’ of North
and South Dakota, Minnesota, and Montana. North Dakota alone is home to more than a third of
the nation’s waterfowl production areas. If wetlands in this vast prairie pothole region were not
saved from drainage, hundreds of species of migratory birds would have been seriously threatened
or become extinct. . . . Nearly 3,000 waterfowl production areas cover 668,000 acres nationwide.
They average 223 acres in size. The smallest is less than an acre (Medicine Lake WPA in North
Dakota) and the largest is 3,733 acres (Kingsbury Lake WPA in Montana).”).
61. CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 225.
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C. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Executive orders are not at all mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. This
raises the question as to where presidents derive their authority to issue an
executive order, as the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly give the
president this power. To respond to this question, a historical perspective
on the separation of powers between the three branches of government
helps to provide context. The U.S. Constitution was preceded by the
Articles of Confederation, the initial founding document establishing the
United States government.62
The Articles of Confederation were
intentionally constructed to establish a very limited central government.63
At the start of our nation’s history, the founding fathers were very wary of
their experiences with King George III of England and his heavy
handedness in ruling the colonies from afar.64 They were concerned about
tyrannical governments and about rulers who were too far removed from
the people.65 Therefore, they wanted to develop a system of government
that would preserve the powers of the people and keep governmental
authority as close to the people as possible. This was accomplished, in part,
by reserving significant powers to the states and by maintaining a very
limited role for the federal government.
However, the new nation soon found that the Articles of Confederation
had established such a weak central government that it caused a great deal
of infighting among the states.66 The leaders of the new nation were
worried that the United States would completely fall apart, and that their
experiment of trying to found a new country would ultimately fail.67 So,
they came together in Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention and
hammered out the new U.S. Constitution, which was adopted in 1787 and

62. James E. Hickey, Jr., Localism, History and the Articles of Confederation: Some
Observations About the Beginnings of U.S. Federalism, 9 IUS GENTIUM 5, 23 (2003).
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 9; Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the
Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 462
(2006) (“The introduction sets forth the background against which the second part of the
Declaration, the evidence of tyranny by the King, is judged. The body of the Declaration provides
evidence for the Declaration’s “indictment” of the King. The list of “evils” visited by King
George on the colonists consists of violations of the English constitution. . . . The final two
paragraphs of the Declaration announce the separation of the colonies from the mother country.”)
(citations omitted).
65. Hickey, Jr., supra note 62, at 9-10.
66. Daniel Stepanicich, Presidential Inaction and the Constitutional Basis for Executive
Nonenforcement Discretion, 18 U. PA. J. CONST.L. 1507, 1515-16 (2016).
67. Steven T. Voigt, The General Welfare Clause: An Exploration of Original Intent and
Constitutional Limits Pertaining to the Rapidly Expanding Federal Budget, 43 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 543, 545 n.9 (2010).
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ratified in 1788.68 Through this document, the founders attempted to
structure the government to give more power to the national government—
because they did not want the nation to collapse, as it had been trending
toward under the Articles of Confederation—but also to continue to have
the federal government be one of limited powers. Again, the founders were
anxious about executive authority, having recently lived under the
oppression of King George III, and they designed the second national
charter—our current Constitution—with limited executive authority.69
They were clearly in favor of legislative preeminence—the legislative
branch would be the branch that spoke for the people of the United States.70
The president was duty-bound to apply the will of the people as distilled
through the legislative authority. But did the founders truly circumscribe
the executive power more so than the power of the legislative branch?
Let’s look at the specific wording of the U.S. Constitution. Article I
establishes the legislative branch, assuming the place of prominence as the
first section of the U.S. Constitution, because the legislature is the closest to
the people.71 Citizens elect the members of the House of Representatives
from their legislative districts within each state.72 Although the U.S.
Constitution originally gave to the state legislatures the authority to elect
the states’ two U.S. Senators,73 this power has now been granted directly to
the people in each state through the Seventeenth Amendment.74 Either way,
both chambers of the U.S. Congress were intended to reflect more closely
the will of the general population than the executive or judicial branches of
the federal government. Because members of Congress have smaller
constituencies than the president, who represents the entire nation, the
legislature is deemed to be the closest branch to the people and the most
highly representative of the peoples’ wishes.
Article I vests those powers “herein granted” to the legislative
branch—to Congress.75 Clause 1 of Article I reads: “All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
68. Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the Origins
of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 461 (2010).
69. Hickey, Jr., supra note 62, at 15.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second year by the People of the several States.”).
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof.”).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof.”).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
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shall consist of a Senate and of a House of Representatives.”76 Stated
another way, only those powers that are enumerated in the U.S.
Constitution shall be assumed by the federal legislature. Any other powers
that are not delineated in the U.S. Constitution are reserved to the states or
to the people, which was made explicit in the Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution in 1791.77 Although the enumerated powers can either be
express or implied, as elucidated in M’Culloch v. Maryland,78 they are
nevertheless circumscribed, such that Congress has definite limitations
beyond which it may not encroach.
Article II, on the other hand, establishes the executive branch, and in
particular, the presidency.79 Article II vests executive powers in the
president, without the limiting “herein granted” clause.80 The first clause of
Article II reads “The executive power shall be vested in a president of the
United States of America.”81 It does not say, “The executive power herein
granted shall be vested in the president of the United States of America.”
Instead, it seems to provide a broad grant of all executive power without the
limiting clause.82
So what difference does this distinction make? Over the years, many
debates have ensued in terms of how much power this clause, without the
limiting phrase, actually grants to the president. Does it grant to the
president additional or general executive powers that are not specifically
listed in Article II? Or does the president have only the powers that are
indicated in the rest of Article II, and this clause simply provides an explicit
granting of those powers listed in Article II to the president, which are still
limited only to those powers? This ambiguity has raised a question as to
whether the president may have executive powers beyond those that are
expressly granted under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.83 These
questions have fostered an ongoing constitutional debate that remains

76. U.S. CONST. art. I.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
78. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 361 (1819).
79. U.S. CONST. art. II.
80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”).
81. U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 1.
82. Stepanicich, supra note 66, at 1519.
83. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108 (“The principal issue is whether the executive power as
set forth in section 1 of article II of the Constitution is a broad specific grant of power or is merely
a summary of powers which are granted in the succeeding sections of the article.”).
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relevant today concerning executive orders and other issues surrounding
recent presidents who have made extensive use of presidential powers.84
These issues came to the fore with President Roosevelt, when he vastly
expanded the powers of the president, in part, through his extensive use of
executive orders.85 Under the U.S. Constitution, the legislative power—the
power to make law—is generally held by the legislative branch.86 By
contrast, the power to give effect to those laws—to implement law—is held
by the President.87 And the power to interpret or apply those laws lies with
the judiciary, and ultimately with the Supreme Court.88 Even with this
system of separation of powers, there is often a blending of powers, and the
separation is not strict, but overlapping.89 The U.S. Constitution has been
interpreted in ways such that each branch has attempted to aggrandize its
own powers.90 For decades, this claim has arisen with respect to the
judiciary, including concerns that the judicial branch has aggrandized itself
and has taken on too much power.91 Claims of a unitary or imperial
president, have also appeared, portending a president who has assumed too
much executive power, including through the use of “presidential
legislation” via executive orders.92 Interestingly, contrary claims also exist
that—on the one hand Congress has appropriated too much power via
federal legislation—and on the other hand, Congress is mired in federal
gridlock where it should be taking action on issues but cannot, and
therefore, is shirking its responsibilities and is not appropriately using its
power when it should.93

84. Stepanicich, supra note 66, at 1519; see also Justin Pierce, Who Lets the Dogs Out?: A
Look at Executive Authority to Wage War Without Prior Legislative Acquiescence, 1 GEO. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 381, 386-87 (2003).
85. Kiyan Bigloo, Aggregation of Powers: Stem Cell Research and the Scope of Presidential
Power Examined through the Lens of Executive Order Jurisprudence, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. REV. 519, 531 (2012) (explaining that “presidents have not shied away from issuing executive
orders to expand the powers of their office during times of relative peace. President Theodore
Roosevelt went further, perhaps, than any other president in declaring that he needed no ‘specific
authorization’ for his powers but could ‘do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless
such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the law.’”) (citations omitted).
86. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 105.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (“The Judiciary, especially the United States Supreme Court, has been the mostcriticized branch for allegedly acting outside the scope of its constitutional authority.”).
92. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 106.
93. The Hon. Jerome LaBarre, Where Democracy Lives, 74 OR. ST. B. BULL. 70, 70 (2014)
(“‘Congressional Gridlock.’ . . . ‘Americans Down On Government.’ These are frequent
headlines in the news. Recent polling data show that 95 percent of U.S. citizens simply do not
believe that our democracy is working.”).
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Of course, the president does have certain enumerated powers, such as
the power as Commander in Chief, the power to issue pardons, and the
power to enter into treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate.94 The
U.S. Constitution, however, does not explicitly give the president the power
to issue executive orders. Therefore, when delivering executive orders,
presidents usually claim either that they are promulgating the executive
order pursuant to their powers granted by a particular statute, through which
a statute delegates power to the executive branch, or if there is no explicit
statutory delegation of power to the president, they may declare that they
are issuing the executive order “By virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States.”95
The fact that executive orders are not expressly mentioned in the U.S.
Constitution does not necessarily mean that they are unconstitutional.96 The
U.S. Constitution is one of the shortest, and oldest, written constitutions in
the world.97 It provides a skeletal framework for our nation’s government,
and was written that way, in part, to facilitate a great deal of flexibility with
respect to our system of government.98 The U.S. Constitution has been
amended only twenty-seven times in over 200 years.99 It is an ingenious
document in terms of framing our government with enough specificity to
enable the government to function, yet with enough malleability to allow

94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Neighbors, supra note 9, at 105.
95. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 106 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952)).
96. Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework
for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 873 (1983) (“[T]he belief that there is a need for the
President to exercise powers not specifically enumerated in the Constitution or not expressly
granted by Congress. For example, the Constitution makes no mention of a Presidential power to
recognize foreign governments or to remove Presidential appointees from office, nor has Congress
ever granted such powers in a statute. Yet it is conceded that the President does have these
powers. Inherent powers such as these are not objectionable so long as they do not disrupt the
‘balance of powers’ among the branches; that is, action is allowed so long as one branch does not
infringe on the authority of another.”) (citations omitted).
97. Wm. David Lytle, Celebrating the Constitution, 36-SEP COLO. LAW. 5, 5 (2007).
98. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (noting that “we must never forget that
it is a constitution we are expounding. . . . This provision is made in a constitution intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.
To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers,
would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a
legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies
which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they
occur.”). For example, the Constitution is silent on the number of members of the Supreme Court,
but the number has worked out to be nine. Stephen R. Alton, From Marbury v. Madison to Bush
v. Gore: 200 Years of Judicial Review in the United States, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 7, 21
(2001) (“The Constitution does not specify the number of justices who must serve on the United
States Supreme Court. Indeed, in the nation’s first century, Congress had by statute varied that
number from as few as six to as many as ten justices. But, since 1869, the number of justices had
remained unchanged at nine—the very same number that serve today.”).
99. Lytle, supra note 97, at 5-6.
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for the vast changes that we have seen in both our country and our world
from the late 1700s through to the present.100 Therefore, many functions,
roles, and activities of the federal government are not written into the text of
the U.S. Constitution, but have evolved over time through precedent
effectuated by the necessity of changing circumstances.
George
Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and the other
initial presidents had to figure out what a president is supposed to do and
how a president faithfully executes the laws. The use of executive orders is
one manner in which presidents have attempted faithfully to execute the
laws.
Roosevelt was the first president under which the use of executive
orders burgeoned, and the process for issuing them was still quite
haphazard.101 In 1906, for example, there is an executive order that he
would have signed, but it is not even dated.102 And sometimes throughout
the early presidencies, the secretaries or cabinet members would write out
an order that they wanted the president to issue, and the president would
simply write “Approved” or “Let it be done” on the document.103 In 1935,
under Franklin Delano Roosevelt—the president who issued the most
executive orders by a vast margin—the federal government initially started
to make the process for establishing executive orders much more
regularized.104 Congress enacted a law and the president issued an
executive order that, together, provided details in terms of how executive

100. Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive Theory Choice, 40 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 259, 277 (2013) (“To survive in the face of rapidly changing cultural and
technological development, a constitution must be flexible—it must bend so that it does not break.
And this kind of flexibility is among the qualities we value most in our Constitution; its critical
joints have enough play that we are able to avoid catastrophic political crises and incorporate even
dramatically changed circumstances into the constitutional apparatus. It is, in part, this very
flexibility—and the value we place upon it—that makes constitutional interpretation necessary
and controversial.”).
101. Sanjay Ranchod, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting Ecosystems with the
Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 535, 543 (2001) (discussing Theodore Roosevelt’s
“unprecedented” number of executive orders); John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of
Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 349
n.131 (2010) (citing KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS
AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER, 66-67 (2001) (“Until the standardization of the format and
publication of executive orders in the 1920s and 1930s, it was unclear which directives by the
President constituted executive orders. This uncertainty resulted in the haphazard issuance and
recording of executive orders. For example, the President might write ‘approved’ or ‘let it be
done’ at the bottom of Cabinet members’ recommendations, or department heads might sign
orders in place of the President, making it unclear which documents had the effect of an executive
order.”)).
102. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 107.
103. Id. (quoting COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957)).
104. Id.
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orders would go forward in the future.105 For example, each executive
order would be published in the Federal Register.106 Previously, anyone
who wanted to find out what executive orders were currently in place would
be required to hunt down whatever documentation existed to determine
what executive orders had been issued by all of the presidents over the
years, and whether they had been superseded.107 In response to this chaotic
system, the initiative in 1935 significantly regularized the process.108 Of
course, establishing a regularized course of action made it easier for
presidents to issue more executive orders and increased the perception of
this mechanism as a legitimate and constitutional use of presidential
authority. Since Congress gave its stamp of approval on the use of
executive orders by passing a law regularizing the process for issuing them,
a majority of people serving in the legislative branch also clearly believed
that executive orders fell within the purview of presidential authority under
the U.S. Constitution.
D. THEORIES OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Several theories have emerged to explain the use of presidential power
and how the president should execute that power while in office. The most
restrictive theory, sometimes known as the constitutional theory, holds that
the president only has the powers that are explicitly designated to that office
in the U.S. Constitution or given by Congress to the president.109 If a
power has not been expressly delegated to the president in the text of the
U.S. Constitution, then the president does not have that power, because—
just as with the legislature—the president is part of the federal government,
and any powers not expressly listed in the U.S. Constitution are reserved to
the states and to the people.110 Although President William Howard Taft

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Fortunately, today such research is much easier. In addition to being listed in the
Federal Register since 1935, now anyone with access to the Internet can find many of them listed
on-line. Peters & Woolley, supra note 11.
108. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 107.
109. Id. at 108; ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8,
at 378 (“Other honorable and well-meaning Presidents . . . took the opposite and, as it seems to
me, narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress rather than of the people,
and can do nothing, no matter how necessary it be to act, unless the Constitution explicitly
commands the action.”).
110. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 380
(“These persons conscientiously believe that the President should solve every doubt in favor of
inaction as against action, that he should construe strictly and narrowly the Constitutional grant of
powers both to the National Government, and to the President within the National Government.”);
see also Chemerinsky, supra note 96, at 871.
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espoused this theory,111 his extensive use of executive orders belies this
claim, at least with respect to this particular expansion of presidential
authority.112
An intermediate theory was embodied by President Roosevelt, labeled
the “stewardship theory.”113 Under this theory, the president is supposed to
act as the steward of the people.114 Therefore, as long as an action is not
explicitly forbidden to the president under the U.S. Constitution or
legislation, it is allowed.115 The president is able to take that action in
furtherance of the good of the nation.116 If the U.S. Constitution or laws
explicitly forbid the president from taking an action, then he cannot do it,
but otherwise he is free to do so.117 He has broad executive powers, as can
be seen in the difference between the first clauses of Article I and Article II,
giving the legislature only those powers “herein granted,” yet giving the
president executive powers without that limitation.118
The third theory is an extension of the stewardship concept, and has
been called the “presidential prerogative theory.”119 Under this theory, the
president has the power to act at his discretion for the public good, not only
without explicit legal authority, but sometimes even against legal or
111. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108 (quoting WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF
MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 16 (1925 ed.) (“This constitutional theory is best summarized by
the following quotation from Taft’s book, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers: ‘The true view
of the Executive function is, as I conceive it, that the President can exercise no power which
cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and
included within such express grant as proper and necessary to exercise.’”).
112. Id. at 115 (noting that although Taft was supposedly an opponent to the stewardship
theory, he still made use of an executive order in contravention of a federal statute).
113. Id. at 108; ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8,
at 371-72.
114. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 371-72;
THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA 466 (Albert Bushnell Hart & Herbert Ronald Ferleger eds.,
Roosevelt Mem’l Ass’n 1941).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, Understanding the Separation of Foreign Affairs Powers
under the Constitution, 60-OCT N.Y. ST. B. J. 8, 10 (1988); see also Shayana Kadidal, Does
Congress Have the Power to Limit the President’s Conduct of Detentions, Interrogations and
Surveillance in the Context of War?, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 23, 33 (2007) (“Could uncheckable
authority over the battlefield derive from the idea that the Framers intended the president to
exercise discretion in interpreting and enforcing the laws? The textual source typically cited for
this is the Vesting Clause: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America.’ The Vesting Clause could easily be seen as simply stating that the President has
power to exercise all discretionary choices left to him by Congress. However, the Clause is seen
by advocates of executive power as implying inherent executive powers not enumerated in the
Constitution, owing to the differences between it (‘The executive power’) and the Legislative
Vesting Clause (‘All legislative powers herein granted’). Alexander Hamilton was likely the first
to make such an argument, and James Madison perhaps the first to refute it.”) (citations omitted).
119. See Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108.
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constitutional mandates.120 For example, this expansive use of presidential
authority arose during the Civil War, when the country was in the middle of
a crisis. The United States faced one of its most atrocious wars. President
Abraham Lincoln felt he must take action, even if that action was contrary
to the U.S. Constitution—for example, his suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.121 He felt it was better to preserve the nation in violation of the
U.S. Constitution, than to be faithful to the U.S. Constitution during a time
of crisis and let the nation itself disintegrate.122 Of course, as a lawyer by
profession, President Lincoln had a tremendous respect for the law and the
U.S. Constitution, so he would not have taken this action lightly.123 In fact,
one of the most renowned executive orders was his Emancipation
Proclamation that freed the slaves.124 Yet even here, under his authority as
Commander in Chief, he felt that he could only free the slaves in states that
were in rebellion and remain consistent with the U.S. Constitution.125 He
120. Id. at 108-09.
121. Id. at 109 n.29 (“The most notable example of a President actually disregarding
constitutional restrictions was Lincoln’s suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. . . . These
instances of questionable use of presidential power have occurred only in war-time or grave
domestic crisis. The Presidents have based this exercise of their power on what they believe are
their inherent powers given them by the Constitution in Article II, § 1.”) (citation omitted).
122. Joseph A. Ranney, Abraham Lincoln’s Legacy to Wisconsin Law, Part 2: Inter Arma
Silent Leges: Wisconsin Law in Wartime, 82-FEB WIS. LAW. 14, 16 (2009) (“Relying heavily on
Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution (which enumerates Congressional powers and prohibits the
suspension of habeas corpus ‘unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it’), Taney issued an opinion declaring that only Congress, not the president, was
empowered to suspend habeas. Lincoln ignored Taney’s decision. In a subsequent message to
Congress Lincoln tacitly acknowledged that Congress, not the president, had primary power over
habeas but he made a powerful appeal to the laws of necessity and interpreted his presidential oath
(which also is prescribed by the Constitution) to require him to preserve the government at all
costs. ‘[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest
that one be violated?’ Lincoln asked. ‘Even in such a case, would not the official oath [to support
the Constitution] be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that
disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?’”) (citations omitted).
123. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 366
(writing about President Lincoln’s actions in the 1860s in light of politically powerful members of
Congress in the early 1900s, Roosevelt noted, “These men still from force of habit applauded what
Lincoln had done in the way of radical dealing with the abuses of his day; but they did not apply
the spirit in which Lincoln worked to the abuses of their own day.”).
124. John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of
Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 340 (2010) (“The President’s most famous
executive order is the Emancipation Proclamation, issued September 22, 1862, and amended
January 1, 1863, which proclaimed the freedom of currently enslaved residents of selected
Confederate States.”).
125. Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional Change, 2008
SUP. CT. REV. 349, 385-86 (2008) (“On January 1, 1863, the final Proclamation was put into
effect. Here Lincoln made the constitutional argument even more precise. He issued it ‘by virtue
of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in
time of actual armed rebellion.’ This was, constitutionally, a war measure designed to cripple the
ability of those in rebellion to resist the lawful authority of the United States. It applied only to
those states and parts of states that were still in rebellion. This was constitutionally essential.
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did not free the slaves in the northern states because he saw his authority as
constitutionally constrained.126 Therefore, although he normally abided by
the stewardship theory,127 he was not afraid to take extraconstitutional
action when necessary. Thus, if a president does not have specific
authority, or is even expressly forbidden from exercising certain powers,
under the presidential prerogative theory, the president should still seize
that authority when deemed in the best interests of the nation. Again, this
view has been attributed to Abraham Lincoln, and to a certain extent to
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.128 With respect to
President Lincoln, the nation was in crisis, but normally presidents would
presumably not need to take that stance and would not do something so
extreme as to act in direct contradiction to the U.S. Constitution.129
Regarding these three theories, on one end of the spectrum is William
Howard Taft, who viewed himself as a strict compliance executive who
refused to stray from what he understood to be the enumerated powers of
the president under the U.S. Constitution130—even though he made
extensive use of executive orders, despite the fact that executive orders are
not mentioned in the text of the U.S. Constitution.131 On the other end of

Lincoln only had power to touch slavery where, as he had told the ministers from Chicago, he
could not ‘enforce the Constitution.’ Where the Constitution was in force, federalism and the
Fifth Amendment prevented presidential emancipation. The document was narrowly written,
carefully designed to withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court, still presided over by Chief
Justice Taney. It narrowly applied only to the states in rebellion. It would not threaten Kentucky
or Missouri and it would not threaten the constitutional relationship of the states and the federal
government.”) (citations omitted).
126. I would like to extend my appreciation to Harry Lembeck for discussing these points
during the symposium.
127. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 378
(“The course I followed, of regarding the executive as subject only to the people, and, under the
Constitution, bound to serve the people affirmatively in cases where the Constitution does not
explicitly forbid him to render the service, was substantially the course followed by both Andrew
Jackson and Abraham Lincoln.”).
128. See Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108.
129. Id. at 110 (noting “[s]ome of the most serious constitutional problems arose during the
Civil War under the presidency of Abraham Lincoln,” including the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus) (citing RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (Rev. ed.
1963)).
130. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 378
(“Other honorable and well-meaning Presidents, such as James Buchanan, took the opposite and,
as it seems to me, narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress rather than
of the people, and can do nothing, no matter how necessary it be to act, unless the Constitution
explicitly commands the action. . . . My successor in office [Taft] took this, the Buchanan, view of
the President’s powers and duties.”).
131. Alissa C. Wetzel, Beyond the Zone of Twilight: How Congress and the Court Can
Minimize the Dangers and Maximize the Benefits of Executive Orders, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 385,
397-98 (2007) (“President Taft continued the trend of setting land aside, even without the
statutory authority that Congress had been unwilling to provide. Significantly, in U.S. v Midwest
Oil Co., the Court upheld Taft’s decision to issue an executive order without Congressional
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the spectrum is Abraham Lincoln, who decided that he was going to save
the country, and if that meant he must explicitly contravene provisions of
the U.S. Constitution—he did so anyway and was confident that his actions
would be vindicated.132 Roosevelt stood in the middle, as a steward of the
people and not espousing either extreme. In his own words, he described
his theory of presidential leadership:
The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my
Administration, next to the insistence upon courage, honesty, and a
genuine democracy of desire to serve the plain people, was my
insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited
only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the
Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional
powers. My view was that every executive officer, and above all
every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the
people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the
people, and not to content himself with the negative merit of
keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. I declined to adopt the
view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation could
not be done by the President unless he could find some specific
authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right
but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded
unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the
laws. Under this interpretation of executive power I did and
caused to be done many things not previously done by the
President and the heads of the departments. I did not usurp power,
but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power. In other
words, I acted for the public welfare, I acted for the common wellbeing of all our people, whenever and in whatever manner was
necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative
prohibition. I did not care a rap for the mere form and show of

authority, holding that Congress had ‘acquiesced’ to Taft’s authority by failing to act itself.
Known as the ‘acquiescence doctrine[,]’ the Court’s holding would come to be an important
method for upholding executive orders in the face of legislative unwillingness to act.”) (citation
omitted).
132. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second
Half-Century, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 667, 726 (2003) (“In short, constitutional necessity
provided its own justification. Whether his actions were legal or not, Lincoln undertook them,
seemingly backed by the populace and the impetus of public exigency. He trusted that Congress
would later vindicate his decisions. Further constitutional controversy was averted when, as
Lincoln predicted, Congress and a sharply divided Supreme Court ratified all of Lincoln’s actions
after the fact. The only unilateral action Lincoln undertook that was not immediately authorized
by Congress was his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and even that was later ratified by
Congress.”) (citation omitted).
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power; I cared immensely for the use that could be made of the
substance.”133
As another way of looking at executive orders—instead of viewing
them as an expansion of executive authority, they could be seen as a selfimposed restriction on executive authority.134 For example, when the
federal government has authority to enter into contracts with vendors, the
president could indicate that the executive branch will limit its own ability
to enter into contracts only with vendors who pay their employees a
specified minimum wage. Another example is where the president
mandates that the federal government will not allow private exploitation of
the natural resources on certain federal lands, but instead will set them aside
for the public good.135 Therefore, the executive branch is not expanding its
authority, but instead is placing a limitation upon its own authority. This
technique is analogous to the Supreme Court’s approach to its own powers
in Marbury v. Madison,136 the seminal case whereby the Supreme Court
refused an expansion of its own power by Congress, indicating that such
expanded authority would go beyond the limits of its powers granted under
the U.S. Constitution.137 Its decision in Marbury was self-executing,
because the Supreme Court needed merely not act—it did not need to rely
upon the actions of another branch of government to enforce its decision.
An example of this self-restraint by the president in exercising his role as
the steward of the people was Roosevelt’s approach to issues concerning
Native Americans. In his autobiography, he explained:
In connection with the Indians, by the way, it was again and again
necessary to assert the position of the President as steward of the
whole people. . . On one occasion, for example, Congress passed a

133. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 371-72.
134. I would like to extend my thanks to Stephen Sepinuck, Associate Dean for
Administration, Gonzaga University School of Law, who suggested these ideas during the 2016
Annual Scholarship Conference of the Central States Law Schools Association, held at the
University of North Dakota School of Law on September 23-24, 2016.
135. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 378 (“I
acted on the theory that the President could at any time in his discretion withdraw from entry any
of the public lands of the United States and reserve the same for forestry, for water-power sites,
for irrigation, and other public purposes. Without such action it would have been impossible to
stop the activity of the land thieves.”).
136. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174-75 (1803). Interestingly, this case involved a
dispute over an executive order. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108 (“The first case in modern
constitutional law, Marbury v. Madison, was precipitated by an ‘executive order.’ The order in
question was President Thomas Jefferson’s order to Secretary of State James Madison to withhold
a judicial commission from William Marbury.”) (citation omitted).
137. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176 (“The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the
act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public
officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution.”).
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bill to sell to settlers about half a million acres of Indian land in
Oklahoma at one and a half dollars an acre. I refused to sign it,
and turned the matter over to [Indian Commissioner] Leupp. The
bill was accordingly withdrawn, amended to as to safeguard the
welfare of the Indians, and the minimum price raised to five
dollars an acre. Then I signed the bill. We sold that land under
sealed bids, and realized for the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
Indians more than four million dollars—three millions and a
quarter more than they would have obtained if I had signed the bill
in its original form.138
Although many executive orders could be viewed as self-imposed
restrictions on the executive branch’s own power (such as restricting its
own ability to enter into contracts, or limiting the use of federal lands),
others clearly cannot (such as the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus).
Roosevelt deemed that, so long as an action was not forbidden to him
under the U.S. Constitution, he would go ahead and take that action and see
what transpired, both with respect to his reelection and with respect to
whether the Supreme Court would deem the action to be unconstitutional.139
If he took an action as president, and the Supreme Court did not strike it
down as unconstitutional, then logically it must be constitutional.140 This is
an example of a situation where the practice of government—the practice of
presidents, for example—if unchallenged by the other branches or by
affected people, has enabled the government’s power to evolve. Of course,
people working in any branch of government have the responsibility to
interpret and apply the U.S. Constitution, so they fully utilize the authority
granted to them by the U.S. Constitution yet remain within the bounds of
their authority. The Supreme Court only steps in when a case is brought
before it to determine whether those interpretations by others are correct.
As a practical matter, if no one brings a challenge against a president’s
action, or if someone brings a challenge and the court defers to the
president, then precedent is established that the president can take that

138. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 377.
139. Id. (regarding another action Roosevelt had taken with respect to Native Americans, he
opined, “[a] subsequent bill was passed on the lines laid down by the Indian Bureau [which he
supported after vetoing a previous bill], referring the whole controversy to the courts, and the
Supreme Court in the end justified our position.”).
140. Branum, supra note 15, at 59-60 (“In contrast to the number of presidential directives
issued, few challenges have been made. Even when challenges are brought, the most notable
contribution of the courts has been its reluctance to get involved. Typically, courts uphold the
presidential directive, find that the plaintiff lacks standing, or hold that the dispute revolves
around a political question that should not be judicially resolved.”) (citation omitted).
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authority.141 And once the precedent has been set, the president and future
presidents will undoubtedly continue to retain that authority as a tool in
their toolbox, magnifying their authority under the constitution a little more
each time such an expansion of authority is exerted. At times, Congress
will also subsequently validate a president’s use of power that was not
previously indicated expressly.142
E. HISTORICAL CONTEXT SHAPING THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S
EXPANSION OF EXECUTIVE POWER
As discussed above, President Roosevelt regarded himself as a trustee
of the lands that were owned by the people via the federal government and
felt that such lands should be put to public use instead of exploited by
private interests.143 This role was both his prerogative and his duty. He
was convinced that he needed to stop the activity of the “land thieves,”144 as
he called them, and to reserve the best of the country’s national lands for
permanent public use.145 He unequivocally rejected the narrowly legalistic
view of his predecessors that he could function only when a statute gave
him the authority to do so. Roosevelt was a servant of the people, not of
Congress, and the charter to which he looked for that power was the U.S.
Constitution itself.146 As another example of an executive order by
Roosevelt with sweeping consequences, “[i]n 1907, the area of the National
Forests was increased by Presidential proclamation more than forty-three
million acres.”147

141. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 378 (“I
acted on the theory that the President could at any time in his discretion withdraw from entry any
of the public lands of the United States and reserve the same for forestry, for water-power sites,
for irrigation, and other public purposes. Without such action it would have been impossible to
stop the activity of the land thieves. No one ventured to test its legality by lawsuit.”).
142. Id. at 379 (“Again Congress showed its wisdom by passing a law which gave the
President the power which he had long exercised.”).
143. Id. at 416-17 (“[T]he rights of the public to the natural resources outweigh private
rights, and must be given its first consideration. Until [Roosevelt restructured the executive
branch], in dealing with the National Forests, and the public lands generally, private rights had
almost uniformly been allowed to overbalance public rights. The change we made was right, and
was vitally necessary; but, of course, it created bitter opposition from private interests.”).
144. Id. at 378.
145. Id. at 374, 378 (“Through Francis Heney I was prosecuting men who were implicated
in a vast network of conspiracy against the law in connection with the theft of public land in
Oregon.”).
146. Id. at 380-81 (“The President’s duty is to act so that he himself and his subordinates
shall be able to do efficient work for the people, and this efficient work he and they cannot do if
Congress is permitted to undertake the task of making up his mind for him as to how he shall
perform what is clearly his sole duty.”).
147. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 418.
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Many of Roosevelt’s critics, and even supporters, thought he was
magnifying his lawmaking clout in an exceedingly dangerous manner, so he
certainly did not have the entire country’s support behind him.148 When
President Roosevelt wanted to establish national wildlife refuges, parks, and
monuments, and to preserve public lands from exploitation by private
interests, his ideas had staunch opponents in some leading members of
Congress.149 For example, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Joseph Cannon of Illinois, infamously claimed, “[n]ot one cent for
scenery!”150 It is important to keep in mind that Speaker Cannon also ruled
the House with an iron fist.151 This one man singlehandedly set the agenda
for the House, only allowing debate and action on legislative proposals that
he supported.152 Through a blatant patronage system, he appointed his
supporters as committee chairs and punished his opponents, thereby
neutralizing their efficacy.153 So, the Congress of the United States—under
the command of Speaker Cannon—was not interested in President
Roosevelt’s conservation measures.
In light of his hegemony, the legislature, under the domination of
“Uncle Joe,” as he was called, was not as representative of the people as the

148. See, e.g., Marc Landy, Incrementalism v. Disjuncture: The President and American
Political Development, 50 TULSA L. REV. 635, 646 (2015) (“William Howard Taft’s ‘AntiGreatness’ lay in his efforts to curb what he took to be the unconstitutional excesses of his
predecessor Theodore Roosevelt. TR had repudiated the strict reading of the Constitution to which
all his predecessors had at least paid lip service. Instead of limiting the powers of the federal
government to those expressly enumerated in that document, he believed that the document should
be interpreted to permit the federal government to do whatever the Constitution did not expressly
forbid, as long as those actions were in the public interest. Taft sought to revive the earlier,
restrictive understanding. He was especially critical of TR’s extensive use of executive orders to
withdraw public lands for conservation purposes. Such policies were legislative in nature and
therefore required congressional not presidential action.”) (citation omitted).
149. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 422
(stating “[t]he refusal of Congress to act in the public interest was solely responsible for keeping
these lands from entry”).
150. Tom Udall, Foreword, 56 NAT. RESOURCES J. vii (2016) (“We have come a long way
from the days of Teddy Roosevelt, when House Speaker Joe Cannon famously said, ‘Not one cent
for scenery!’” That seems ridiculous to us now. It probably was ridiculous to a lot of folks even
then.”).
151. Ivan Ermakoff, Patrimony and Collective Capacity: An Analytical Outline, 636
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 182, 187-88 (2011).
152. See, e.g., Margaret Sanregret Shockley, “Cannonizing” Under Newt Gingrich: The
Speaker’s Consolidation of Power in the House of Representatives, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 165
(1998) (“The turn of the century brought a steady rise in power of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives that reached its peak during the Speakership of Joseph Gurney Cannon (R-IL).
During Cannon’s reign as Speaker from 1903 to 1911, House power was virtually consolidated
into one person—the Speaker. Cannon’s unbridled reign and successful manipulation of House
procedure to implement his personal agenda resulted in a House revolt led by House Democrats
and empowered by Progressive House Republicans.”).
153. Id.
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founding fathers may have anticipated.154 The Federalists—Jefferson,
Madison, and other early proponents of limited government authority—may
have intended that if Congress has decided it is not interested in an issue, it
is not for the president to surpass the sovereignty of Congress and take up
that issue by the sole authority of the powers vested in the executive office.
Yet perhaps if they had anticipated a heavy-handed authoritarian leader
controlling the legislative branch—a perceived tyrant who was
championing the interests of a handful of wealthy tycoons wanting to
pillage the nation’s national resources and pocket the profits for themselves
instead of for the public good—under those circumstances the founders
may have wanted a strong president to serve as a counterweight. While
President Roosevelt attempted to press through progressive measures,
Speaker Cannon and his colleagues continued to block them.155
In political debates, one often hears a mantra, by whomever is
frustrated with one of the branches of the federal government, that we
should go back to the intent of the founders and live according to the
founders’ vision of government and society. Yet, it is important to
remember that the founders’ vision of society was that it is ever changing,
and their vision of the U.S. Constitution was that it must be sufficiently
flexible in order to meet the ever changing needs of the nation. As Chief
Justice John Marshall expounded in McCulloch v. Maryland, the U.S.
Constitution is a malleable document.156
The words of the U.S.
Constitution are the same today as they were in 1889, with the exception of
the twenty-seven amendments that have modified specific portions of the
original document.157 Therefore, the U.S. Constitution today is largely the
same as it was at the start of our country; although amendments have
changed it in some vitally important ways. It is a skeletal framework for
how our government should function, and although the ways in which that
154. Id.
155. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 367 (“We
succeeded in working together . . . for some years, I pushing forward and they hanging back.
Gradually, however, I was forced to abandon the effort to persuade them to come my way, and
then I achieved results only by appealing over the heads of the Senate and House leaders to the
people, who were the masters of both of us. I continued in this way to get results until almost the
close of my term.”).
156. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 407 (explaining that “we must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding. . . . This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have
prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would
have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal
code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which,
if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.”).
157. Richard Albert, American Exceptionalism in Constitutional Amendment, 69 ARK. L.
REV. 217, 224 (2016).
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skeleton have been fleshed out have evolved over the years, the skeleton
created by the founders endures.
There are many ways in which one could interpret the words in our
written U.S. Constitution. Because it is skeletal, it does not explicitly list
all of the powers granted to, and all of the restrictions upon, any of the
branches of government.158 Roosevelt, therefore, interpreted the U.S.
Constitution to provide himself with authority to issue substantive executive
orders. If Speaker Joseph Cannon was going to put a hold on legislation for
the public good—for example, for scenery that was so grand that Roosevelt
felt it should have national prominence and protection—then Roosevelt was
going to take that authority for himself under the power that was granted to
him as the chief executive.159 The president must interpret the U.S.
Constitution to try to determine the extent of his or her powers, the
legislature must interpret the U.S. Constitution to try to determine the extent
of its powers, and the judiciary must interpret the U.S. Constitution—not
only to determine the extent of its powers, but also using the doctrine of
judicial review to resolve whether the president and Congress have
exceeded their powers under the U.S. Constitution. The president can
conclude that when he perceives a need to take a particular action, and
considers such an action to be constitutional, he can take that action. The
only thing that would hold back the president in this situation is if someone
challenged that action in court, and the federal courts using their power of
judicial review decided the action contravenes the U.S. Constitution.160 In
his autobiography, Roosevelt wrote:
In a number of instances the legality of executive acts of my
Administration was brought before the courts. They were
uniformly sustained. For example, prior to 1907 statutes relating

158. This not only pertains to the separation of powers at the federal level, but also with
respect to the powers of the federal government vis-à-vis the states. Those who are in favor of
states’ rights would want to go back in time and assert that the federal government as a whole has
too much power today. They advocate that we should decentralize the power of the federal
government and devolve that power back onto the states.
159. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 420
(While discussing “[t]he idea that the Executive is the steward of public welfare,” Roosevelt
indicated that “The laws were often insufficient, and it became well nigh impossible to get them
amended in the public interest when once the representatives of privilege in Congress grasped the
fact that I would sign no amendment that contained anything not in the public interest. It was
necessary to use what law was already in existence, and then further to supplement it by Executive
action.”).
160. Unless something is expressly permitted (“The President. . . shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.)
or expressly forbidden in the Constitution (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.), it would be rare that there could not be a debate about a
particular issue and good arguments made on both sides.
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to the disposition of coal lands had been construed as fixing the
flat price at $10 to $20 per acre. The result was that valuable coal
lands were being sold for wholly inadequate prices, chiefly to big
corporations. By executive order the coal lands were withdrawn
and not opened for entry until proper classification was placed
thereon by Government agents. There was a great clamor that I
was usurping legislative power; but the acts were not assailed in
court until we brought suits to set aside entries made by persons
and associations to obtain larger areas than the statutes authorized.
This position was opposed on the ground that the restrictions
imposed were illegal; that the executive orders were illegal. The
Supreme Court sustained the Government. In the same way our
attitude in the water power question was sustained, the Supreme
Court holding that the Federal Government had the rights we
claimed over streams that are or may be declared navigable by
Congress. Again, when Oklahoma became a State we were
obliged to use the executive power to protect Indian rights and
property, for there had been an enormous amount of fraud in the
obtaining of Indian lands by white men. Here we were denounced
as usurping power over a State as well as usurping power that did
not belong to the executive. The Supreme Court sustained our
action.161
Roosevelt, although he had a massive personality, probably did not
intend to set himself up as a new American monarch, seizing as much
power for the presidency as he could muster. In fact, his primary concern
was for the common person, as opposed to the upper class,162 and for
wildlife preservation in the face of large corporate interests.163 Roosevelt
was a strong believer in democracy, in the will of the people, and in the
legislature as the representative of the people. For example, he was very
supportive of state legislatures taking action to further progressive
causes.164 He was very supportive of the will of the people acting through

161. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 376-77.
162. Id. at 417 (“One of the principles whose application was the source of much hostility
was this: It is better for the Government to help a poor man make a living for his family than to
help a rich man make more profit for his company.”).
163. Id. at 434 (“Even more important was the taking of steps to preserve from destruction
beautiful and wonderful wild creatures whose existence was threatened by greed and
wantonness.”).
164. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of
Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751, 780 (2009)
(discussing Roosevelt’s attack on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner, striking down a
progressive New York statute: “The Court had struck down the law, despite the approval of the
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their elective representatives to solve the problems of the times. Although
he may certainly have enjoyed the significant powers that the U.S.
Constitution bestowed upon the president and exercised them to the fullest
to accomplish his objectives, it is doubtful that his intent would have been
to contravene the U.S. Constitution and take powers that were clearly
beyond those granted to the executive. His primary concern was for the
public good, and if Congress refused to act or was incapable of acting, that
was when he felt the need to step up and take the power granted to the
executive under the U.S. Constitution and take action.
Roosevelt’s detractors feared that he had magnified his own power in
ways that made him too independent of the separation of powers and checks
and balances so carefully laid out in the U.S. Constitution, even if such
powers were theoretically permissible under its text. Yet, one must
remember that when the country first emerged, government, society, the
economy, the military, and most other aspects of life were much simpler.
Shortly after the country’s founding, the federal government had fewer than
3000 employees.165 During the nation’s transformation from a primarily
agrarian and rural country to a largely industrialized and increasingly urban
country, the federal government correspondingly burgeoned to deal with the
rapidly growing and increasingly complex problems of the nation.166
Shortly after Roosevelt’s presidency, the number of civilian employees had
increased to nearly 400,000 in 1916.167 Fast-forward to the present time,
and the federal government consists of over 2,600,000 civilian employees
in the executive branch alone (not taking into account military employees,

New York legislature and the New York courts, on the theory of a ‘liberty to work under
unhygienic conditions.’ It was a decision ‘nominally against State rights . . . but really against
popular rights, against the democratic principle of government by the people under the forms of
law.’”) (citation omitted).
165. STAFF OF CONG. BUDGET OFF., 95TH CONG., THE FEDERAL WORK FORCE: ITS SIZE,
COST AND ACTIVITIES 1 (Mar. 1977), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/95th-congress-19771978/reports/77doc720.pdf (“The federal government, as organized in 1789, consisted of the
Departments of State, Treasury, and War; plus the Office of the Attorney General. In 1792 the
Post Office was added; and a separate Department of the Navy was established in 1798. By 1800
the number of people working in these various departments had reached an estimated 3,000
employees.”) (citation omitted).
166. Id. at 2 (“During the years between the end of the Civil War and the end of World War
I, the United States changed from a rural, agrarian society into an industrial, increasingly urban
society.”).
167. Id. at 3 (“Civilian staffing of the executive branch increased substantially during this
period. Total staffing in 1916, just prior to the large buildup associated with World War I, was
391,000—a 1,000 percent increase from 1861. The Post Office Department still represented the
largest component (212,000), but the staffing for other federal activities had grown much more
rapidly than the Post Office Department during the period.”).
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which number around 1,500,000).168 For the president to manage such an
enormous bureaucracy and that massive number of employees—most of
whom are in the executive branch—the president needs to be able to
exercise considerably more power than the president had to do so when
there were only 3000 employees and he led a much simpler governmental
system. So, by virtue of the fact that our society, our country, and the world
have become so much more complex, all three branches of government
have significantly expanded their powers and authorities under the U.S.
Constitution to survive in modern times.169
Passionate debates continue to this day about the benefits of federalism
and a strong national government versus the benefits of decentralization and
strong state governments. These debates reflect those that occurred at the
founding of the country—both during the intentionally weak federal
government and much stronger state governments under the Articles of
Confederation, and during the debates surrounding the Constitutional
Convention establishing a stronger federal government so the country
would not collapse. If the United States had a federal government today as
in its infancy, with only several thousand employees, the country could not
function, because the present is so much more complex.
Roosevelt became president at the beginning of the Twentieth Century,
when vast changes were taking place within society and the economy, and
the government needed more resources to be able to respond to those
changes.170 Industrialization, urbanization, and the expansion of major
corporations were all occurring around the time that Roosevelt was in
office.171 Many of the wealthy elite and corporate interests were attempting
to plunder public lands for their own private interests.172 He intended to
ameliorate some of the problems caused by industrialization and
urbanization, which other leaders at the time, such as Jane Addams, were

168.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., Historical Federal Workforce Tables,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employmentreports/historical-tables/total-government-employment-since-1962/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
169. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 105-06 (“The office of the President has been expanded
both as to numbers and varieties of activities which are carried out by the President. This increase
in executive power is an outgrowth of both hot and cold wars, economic crises and the multitude
of complex problems which confront the highly industrialized American society.”).
170. STAFF OF CONG. BUDGET OFF., 95TH CONG., supra note 165, at 2 (“The growth of the
modern corporation and its domination of large segments of the economy also brought a major
addition to the federal government’s administrative machinery.”).
171. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 437.
172. Id. at 425 (“Throughout the early part of my Administration the public land policy was
chiefly directed to the defense of the public lands against fraud and theft.”).
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trying to address.173 The increase in the nation’s population also put great
pressure on the country’s natural resources, which Roosevelt championed.
As described above, he addressed wildlife devastation and the potential
threats to the nation’s lands through executive orders and other initiatives,
which have left a wonderful legacy through the national parks, monuments,
and wildlife refuges.174 Because of the increasing complexity and
increasing problems that the nation has had to address, by virtue of
necessity, the federal government has had to increase the use of its powers.
Of course, every time the government does so, one can expect pushback.
There will be claims of presidential tyranny and the unitary executive, of
legislative tyranny wherein Congress is taking on too much power, and
judicial tyranny via the activist courts.
Roosevelt was certainly willing to push the envelope with respect to
interpreting the U.S. Constitution’s grant of executive authority. However,
when considered as one episode along the course of the nation’s history,
Roosevelt’s actions could be seen as fitting squarely within an American
tradition and its flexible U.S. Constitution that allows a certain amount of
fluctuation back and forth with respect to presidential power vis–à–vis that
of the other branches of government. At the turn of the Twentieth Century,
his actions would have raised numerous red flags, because he was taking
initiatives that had not been done before. But if one considers his actions
through the perspective of the course of time, they could be considered as
measured steps that were calculated to push against, yet not rupture, the
bounds of the U.S. Constitution.175
F. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Presidents have issued many other executive orders throughout
history—some clearly in the public interest, and some that have not been
viewed as charitably under the gaze of time. For example, a later-maligned
executive order was Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s initiative in 1942

173. William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ Rights, 72 OHIO ST. L.
J. 1115, 1125 (2011) (“Figures like Teddy Roosevelt, Louis Brandeis, Jane Addams, and Herbert
Croly insisted that the United States could not remain a constitutional republic without social and
economic reform. Overwork, joblessness, material insecurity, tyrannical workplaces, and a lack
of decent housing and education left the nation’s working classes ill-equipped for democratic
citizenship. America was becoming a corporate oligarchy; working people were wage slaves,
ciphers, and servants.”) (citation omitted).
174. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 435-36.
175. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 118 (“[I]t is nonetheless quite obvious that Presidents who
are considered “great Presidents” have made the greatest use of the executive order thereby
permitting the country to move forward and to solve the problems confronting it.”).
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mandating the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.176
This action is now widely perceived to be a negative mark, not only on the
presidency but also on the Supreme Court, which upheld that order in a
decision that has subsequently been strongly criticized.177
Although executive orders are not unconstitutional per se, they may be
declared unconstitutional by the courts, if the president uses this mechanism
to go beyond executive authority with a particular action.178 Another
infamous executive order was issued by President Harry S. Truman, which
was reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in what is known as the Steel
Seizure Case in 1952 during the Korean War.179 Employees working in
steel factories across the United States had threatened to strike as a result of
a labor dispute with the management of the companies.180 President
Truman was afraid that steel production would grind to a halt. The country
was involved in a war, and he was concerned that a strike would affect the
war effort.181 Therefore, using his power as Commander in Chief, he issued
an executive order to his secretary of commerce, commanding the secretary
to take over the operation of all of the steel mills within the United States to
prevent the labor stoppage and to keep the steel mills open.182 When the
federal government began running the private steel mills, the companies’
leaders caused an uproar, and quickly brought a lawsuit up to the U.S.
Supreme Court.183
176. Branum, supra note 15, at 28.
177. Craig Green, Ending The Korematsu Era: An Early View from The War on Terror
Cases, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 985 (“Every American lawyer knows Korematsu v. United States
as a discredited precedent.”).
178. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 112.
179. Id.; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
180. Kimberley L. Fletcher, The Court’s Decisive Hand Shapes the Executive’s Foreign
Affairs Policymaking Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 247, 267 (2013).
181. Jason Hart, To Preserve, Protect, and Defend: An Imminent Threat Approach to
Resolving the Question of Inherent Powers After ACLU v. NSA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 315, 322
(2007) (“Fearing that such a strike would endanger American lives and national security by
paralyzing the steel industry, Truman authorized the Federal Government to nationalize the steel
mills, thereby placing the steel industry under government control”).
182. Id. (“Specifically, Truman’s order directed the Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of the steel mills. To accomplish this end, the Secretary ordered the presidents of the
seized companies to serve as operating managers of the mills pursuant to his instructions.”)
(citation omitted).
183. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 582-84; Fletcher, supra note 180, at 267
(“This announcement was met with uniform shock.”). The media also reacted extremely
negatively to Truman’s action. Charles C. Hileman et.al, Supreme Court Law Clerks’
Recollections of October Term 1951, Including the Steel Seizure Cases, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1239, 1265 (2008) (“The response to this action by President Truman was swift and negative. The
Chicago Daily News called it ‘leaping socialism.’ The New York Daily News said ‘Hitler and
Mussolini would have loved this.’ The Washington Post wrote, ‘President Truman’s seizure of
the steel industry will probably go down in history as one of the most high-handed acts committed
by an American President.’”).
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The Supreme Court needed to establish an approach for determining
the constitutionality of executive orders—whether a particular executive
order would be considered within the authority of the president.184 The
majority held that President Truman’s executive order indeed overstepped
the bounds of authority of the president.185 Issuing an executive order to
take over private corporations was too far removed from the president’s
power as Commander in Chief to be deemed a legitimate use of that
power.186 However, the majority opinion was not the most influential
opinion arising out of the Steel Seizure Case.187 Instead, the concurring
opinion by Justice Jackson has become the seminal opinion.188 He
delineated three categories of presidential power, depending on whether the
president has the backing of Congress, whether Congress has been silent, or
whether Congress has spoken out against the president having the power to
take a particular action.189 If the latter, than the president will only have
those powers that are designated solely to him under the U.S. Constitution,
and not any of the powers that are shared with, or designated to, the
legislative branch.190 In terms of presidential power, Justice Jackson
indicated that when the president is acting in concert with Congress, such as
when Congress has enacted a statute authorizing the president to take an
action, and the president takes an action under that statute, then the
president has all of the powers that can be delegated to him by Congress.191
Therefore, the president has the weight of all of the legislative powers
behind him, in addition to all of the president’s own independent powers
under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. That is when the president’s
powers are at their strongest. If Congress has not spoken—if Congress has
been silent on the issue—then the president has all of the powers designated
to the executive, as well as any powers that are not expressly denied to the
president by the U.S. Constitution or by Congress. Under the third
category, if Congress has expressly denied the president certain powers to

184. Fletcher, supra note 180, at 267-68.
185. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 588-89.
186. Timothy D. A. O’Hara, Without Justification: Misplaced Reliance on United Nations
Security Council Resolutions for Presidential War Making, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 583, 605
(1998) (“The Court held that neither the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief nor as Chief
Executive could sustain the order to seize the mills.”).
187. Fletcher, supra note 180, at 268 (explaining that “Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion
in Steel Seizure has become the leading authority”).
188. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring);
Neighbors, supra note 9, at 115.
189. James Park Taylor, Singularity: We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us: A Legal Guide
to U.S. Citizens as ‘Enemy Combatants’, 29-APR MONT. LAW. 8, 27 (2004).
190. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 115.
191. Id.
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take an action, and yet the president takes that action anyway, then the
president’s action will be upheld only if that power has been explicitly
delegated solely to the president, and not to Congress.192 In the Steel
Seizure Case, Congress had considered granting the power to the president
that would have allowed him to take this action through an amendment, but
had decided against granting that power.193 The Supreme Court considered
that action to be a signal that Congress did not want to grant this authority
to the president, and therefore, the president’s powers were at their lowest
ebb. Because Congress also had the authority under the Commerce Clause
to regulate steel mills, its decision not to accept the amendment effectively
denied the president this power. Therefore, his executive order seizing the
steel mills was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional.
Under Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Supreme Court examined the
intersection of presidential and congressional actions along a continuum,
rather than in the three, clear-cut categories that Justice Jackson had
delineated in the Steel Seizure Case.194 Congress does not always explicitly
grant the president the authority to take a specific action, nor does it always
explicitly deny the president particular authority to take a specific action.
The Steel Seizure Case was actually one of those cases in the gray area
along the continuum. Congress did not pass a law refusing to grant this
authority to the president. It simply considered adopting into a bill an
amendment that would have granted the president this authority, but
decided against it.195 The Supreme Court determined that by not adopting
the amendment, Congress intended not to grant the president this authority.
However, attempting to determine congressional intent is not always easy,
especially when making a leap in logic that congressional refusal to adopt
192. Taylor, supra note 189, at 27 (“The third category is for cases in which the president
acts contrary to the express will of Congress. In this category the president’s actions will be
sustained only if Congress was without authority to legislate on the subject.”).
193. Neighbors, supra note 9, at 115.
194. John Cary Sims, Ten Questions: Responses of John Cary Sims, 33 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1593, 1595 (2007) (“Dames & Moore v. Regan affirms the vitality of Justice Jackson’s
approach, while suggesting that it is more of a continuum than a set of three firm categories.”).
195. Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
87, 140 (2002) (“Justice Frankfurter focused in part on the fact that, in considering the TaftHartley Act, the House had rejected an amendment that would have granted the President seizure
authority. In addition, one of the Senate sponsors of the legislation specifically noted that the
Senate Labor Committee had considered and rejected including a seizure provision. The other
concurring Justices embraced Justice Frankfurter’s conclusion. In other words, Congress’s
consideration and rejection of a particular tool for dealing with industrial strife precluded the
President’s reliance on it. Even if Congress had not occupied the field by providing alternative
procedures, legislative history indicating a specific rejection of the seizure authority signaled
Congress’s opposition to that course of action. Inferences from the legislative landscape thus
influenced the Court’s determination that the President acted in opposition to Congress’s will.”)
(citation omitted).
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an amendment means that Congress specifically intended to deny the
president that authority. If Congress had intended to deny the president the
authority to take a particular action, why did it not do so explicitly, by
passing a law forbidding such an action? Using legislative inaction to
interpret congressional intent may not always be accurate. Nevertheless,
this method of statutory interpretation is frequently utilized by the courts, as
exemplified in the Steel Seizure Case.
The Supreme Court will only rarely decide that a president’s executive
order is unconstitutional.196 The Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have generally been quite deferential when the president takes action,
particularly under executive orders, such as occurred during President
Roosevelt’s time in office.197 It will be interesting to see how the courts
handle these issues in the future.
G. RECENT USE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS
These questions have fostered an ongoing constitutional debate that is
relevant today, as well, concerning executive orders and other issues
surrounding President Barak Obama, in addition to other recent presidents
who have made extensive use of presidential powers. A historical
examination of Roosevelt’s approach to governmental powers offers insight
into what is sometimes referred to in more recent times as the
aggrandizement of presidential power, or the development of the “imperial
presidency.”198

196. Branum, supra note 15, at 37 (“Only three Presidents have had executive orders
overturned in their entirety by the courts.”); id. at 59 (“From the inception of our republic through
1999, only 253 presidential directives had been modified or revoked, either by Congress or by the
courts. A Cato Institute study completed late in 1999 found that Congress had modified or
revoked 239 executive orders, while the courts had struck down only fourteen orders, either in
whole or in part. The orders struck down by the courts resulted from eighty-six challenges, and
only two orders had been wholly overturned. Since that time, one additional executive order has
been overturned in its entirety by a lower court.”) (citation omitted); Neighbors, supra note 9, at
117 (“The courts have shown a marked reluctance to declare acts of the chief executive
unconstitutional.”).
197. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 421 (For
example, in light of Roosevelt’s unprecedented actions concerning the Forest Service, “Suits were
begun wherever the chance arose. It is worth recording that, in spite of the novelty and
complexity of the legal questions it had to face, no court of last resort has ever decided against the
Forest Service. This statement includes two unanimous decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States (U.S. vs. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, and Light vs. U.S., 220 U.S. 523).”).
198. Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring The Imperial Presidency: An Examination of President
Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 455, 456 (2002); see also Daryl
J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 34 (2016)
(“Many see the President as increasingly ‘imperial,’ helming ‘the most dangerous branch,’
unimpeded by the separation of powers, and even posing an existential threat to constitutional
democracy.”) (citation omitted).
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For example, an August 2016 New York Times article entitled “Once
Skeptical of Executive Power, Obama Has Come to Embrace It” notes:
Blocked for most of his presidency by Congress, Mr. Obama has
sought to act however he could. In the process he created the kind
of government neither he nor the Republicans wanted—one that
depended on bureaucratic bulldozing rather than legislative
transparency. But once Mr. Obama got the taste for it, he pursued
his executive power without apology, and in ways that will shape
the presidency for decades to come.199
President Obama has not hesitated to use executive orders in the face of
congressional inaction on issues he believes are of vital importance to the
nation. In his State of the Union address, Mr. Obama announced:
“[w]henever I can take steps without legislation to expand opportunity for
more American families, that’s what I’m going to do.”200 For example, he
introduced an executive order raising the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour
for several hundred thousand federal contract workers, and many large
corporations soon followed suit.201
Previously, President George W. Bush also evoked claims of an
“imperial presidency.”202 For example, one article posited that his actions
“should trouble all Americans who believe in the democratic process and
the preservation of constitutional limitations on the power of the executive.
American freedom and democracy cannot coexist with an imperial
presidency.”203
In their book The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic,
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that “law does little to constrain
the modern executive . . . whereas politics and public opinion do constrain
the modern executive . . . .”204 They echo the presidential prerogative
theory previously discussed. In particular, Posner and Vermeule explore

199. Binyamin Applebaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive Power, Obama
Has Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/
14/us/politics/obama-era-legacy-regulation.html?_r=1; see also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010) (Arguing
that “law does little to constrain the modern executive . . . whereas politics and public opinion do
constrain the modern executive.”).
200. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014), in President
Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE OF BARACK OBAMA (2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamasstate-union-address (emphasis added).
201. Applebaum & Shear, supra note 199.
202. The Imperial Presidency, THE NATION (Aug. 29, 2002), https://www.thenation.com/
article/imperial-presidency/.
203. Id.
204. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 199, at 15.
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presidential actions in response to emergencies such as 9/11 and the 2008
economic crisis.205 Perhaps shockingly, they surmise that the president is
not bound by law—whether by statutes or constitutional confines, but
instead they are, as a practical matter, only bound by public opinion and
politics.206 During a president’s first term in office, he is only bound by his
desire to be re-elected, and during his second term, by his desire to assure
his place in history. The argument should not necessarily go that far,
because Congress still controls the purse strings that provide funding for all
executive branch programs. Therefore, legislation enacted by Congress can
still tie the hands of the executive branch—including the president—and
affect the lives of millions. Although the president retains veto power, he
or she cannot force their will on every issue, and those compromises have
real effects constraining the actions of the executive branch.
Yet, the balance of power regarding policy initiatives has shifted
significantly toward the president and the executive branch.
This
examination of President Roosevelt’s deliberate aggrandizement of
presidential power suggests that this shift occurred over one century ago.
An August 2013 New York Times article discusses how “executive power
has expanded steadily under both Republican and Democratic presidents in
recent decades.”207 Again, this Article demonstrates that the expansion of
executive power has not only occurred in recent decades, but has been a
part of the American constitutional system for over one hundred years,
originating in significant measure with President Roosevelt and his legacy.
III. ROOSEVELT’S ATTEMPTS TO REIN IN THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH
In contrast to Roosevelt’s success in expanding the use of the executive
order to rebalance power between the executive and legislative branches, he
was less successful in his attempts to limit the powers of the judicial
branch.208 This section will examine his changing perspectives on the
appropriateness of an independent judiciary.209
Judicial recall is a process by which, when the populace is displeased
with a particular judge, it can take measures to hold a recall election,

205. See generally id.
206. Id.
207. Applebaum & Shear, supra note 199 (emphasis added).
208. G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections Work, 74 MO. L. REV. 605, 606-07 (2009)
(“Although none of these proposals was adopted nationally, they did enjoy some success in the
states. During the early twentieth century, seven states provided for the recall of judges.”).
209. Professor Kermit Roosevelt, III, also highlighted Theodore Roosevelt’s approach to
these issues during his fascinating keynote lecture at the symposium.
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meaning it can vote the judge out of office.210 This could either be a vote of
the general public or it could be a vote by the legislature to remove the
judge from office, depending on the process that has been established in a
given state.211 Although, initially, a regular judicial election and a judicial
recall vote may appear similar, the differences between the two are
significant. Judicial elections are regularly scheduled, the judge knows
when he or she will be up for election again, the terms are generally quite
long, and an incumbent judge may be challenged by a specific individual
who is vying for that position.212 For example, in the North Dakota
Supreme Court, each justice is elected once every ten years.213 Judicial
elections arise only periodically, so the judge is not constantly looking over
his or her shoulder in fear after making an unpopular decision. Elections
enable the electorate to consider the aggregate of the judge’s opinions,
rather than casting their ballots immediately in the aftermath of a highly
controversial decision. However, with judicial recall, if judges make a
contentious opinion, then shortly thereafter, that judge can be voted out of
office. Knowing this, judges may be more reluctant to rule according to the
law if they know their ruling may be unpopular, and may feel impelled to
rule according to popular sentiments, even if they feel that decision is not
the right one.
Judicial recall should also be distinguished from impeachment, which
entails a more difficult process to remove a judge for specific misconduct (a
higher threshold than a simple majority vote as required during recall
campaigns).214 Impeachment is another way in which members of the

210. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493,
532 (2013) (Removal of judges can be effected through “the legislative address, which authorizes
the legislature to seek the removal of a judge by petitioning the governor; automatic removal of a
judge upon conviction of specified crimes, which gives the executive branch a role to play in
judicial removal through criminal prosecution; and judicial recall, in which the electorate is
enabled to seek the removal of a judge in special elections.”) (emphasis added).
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., the provision for judicial elections in the North Dakota Constitution at N.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 7.
213. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
214. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. XI, §§ 8-10:
Section 8. The house of representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.
The concurrence of a majority of all members elected shall be necessary to an
impeachment.
Section 9. All impeachments shall be tried by the senate. When sitting for that
purpose the senators shall be upon oath or affirmation to do justice according to the
law and evidence. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds
of the members elected. When the governor or lieutenant governor is on trial, the
presiding judge of the supreme court shall preside.
Section 10. The governor and other state and judicial officers, except county judges,
justices of the peace and police magistrates, shall be liable to impeachment for
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judiciary, or of the executive or legislative branches, can be removed from
office. However, impeachment has several important distinctions from
judicial recall. For example, at the federal level, the power to impeach lies
with the House of Representatives,215 and the power to try an official who
has been impeached lies with the Senate.216 Therefore, checks and balances
are built into the impeachment process, so federal judges are protected
against the whims of members of Congress who may not like a judge’s
unpopular decision. Moreover, the impeachment process normally requires
higher standards regarding the actions for which a judge can be impeached,
not merely an unpopular decision,217 and includes significant procedural
safeguards such as supermajority requirements.218 However, if a procedure
for recall exists within a particular state, that procedure is constantly
hanging over the judge’s head as a constant reminder that if he or she makes
an unpopular decision, there is a distinct possibility that the judge could be
removed from office.
Under judicial review, judges determine whether a statute is
constitutional, examining it to decide if the legislature had the authority to
enact it and whether its provisions contravene the U.S. Constitution. The
power of judicial review, meaning the court’s authority to review a statute
to determine whether it complies with the U.S. Constitution, was not
explicitly granted to the federal judiciary or the Supreme Court under the
text of the U.S. Constitution.219 The U.S. Constitution does not expressly
give federal judges the power to review the constitutionality of statutes
passed by Congress and signed by the President. Instead, the power of
judicial review was established by one of the first cases decided by the
Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison, in 1803, shortly after the founding of
our country.220 In Marbury, the Court determined that a provision in a
statute conflicted with a provision in the U.S. Constitution. In weighing
which law to follow—the statute or the Constitution—Chief Justice John
Marshall expounded:
habitual drunkenness, crimes, corrupt conduct, or malfeasance or misdemeanor in
office, but judgment in such cases shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office of trust or profit under the state. The person
accused, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to indictment,
trial, judgment and punishment according to law.
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
217. E.g., at the federal level, removal by impeachment is only for “treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“[N]o person shall be convicted without the concurrence
of two thirds of the members present.”).
219. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
220. Id.
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It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each.
So if a law [e.g., a statute] be in opposition to the constitution, if
both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that
the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of
judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply.
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to
be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the
necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the
constitution, and see only the law [e.g., a statute].
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written
constitutions.221
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall claimed the authority of the federal
courts to declare a statute unconstitutional when it conflicts with the U.S.
Constitution.222 Therefore, a law that was passed by the democraticallyelected branches of government could be struck down by a judge who
considers the law in light of the U.S. Constitution and deems that law to be
unconstitutional. If the judge is going to be faithful to that Constitution,
and yet the statute contradicts the U.S. Constitution, which should the judge
apply—the statute or the U.S. Constitution? Should the judge adhere to the
statute, effectively meaning that the U.S. Constitution is simply an
amalgamation of words written on a piece of paper and has no real meaning

221. Id. at 177-78.
222. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. . . . Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation of each. . . . If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply . . . a law repugnant to the constitution
is void; and . . . [the] courts . . . are bound by that instrument.”).
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or effect, and that neither the judges nor the other branches of government
have to follow it? Or, if there is a conflict between the statute and the U.S.
Constitution, should the judge apply the U.S. Constitution, meaning that he
or she must strike down the conflicting statute as unconstitutional. When
Chief Justice Marshall wrote the Marbury opinion, he determined that when
the Court considers a statute that has been enacted by Congress, and
compares it with the U.S. Constitution, it is the U.S. Constitution that is the
highest law of the land—not the statute.223 Therefore, the Court may
determine that a statute passed by the state legislature or by Congress is
unconstitutional—in other words, that the legislative branch does not have
the authority under the U.S. Constitution to enact such a statute, or that the
statute conflicts with a provision in the U.S. Constitution.
Similarly, state courts have the power to determine whether state laws
are consistent with or conflict with their state constitutions.224 Sometimes
their power is written expressly in the state constitutions. For example,
North Dakota’s constitution allows the North Dakota Supreme Court to
strike down legislation as unconstitutional, but it requires a supermajority of
votes to do so (or four of the five justices, instead of three of the five
justices to decide a regular case).225
The idea is that judges are wise jurists who respect the U.S.
Constitution—both the U.S. Constitution at the national level and the state
constitutions that structure each state’s governmental system. Judges are
supposed to protect the country against extraconstitutional behavior by the
other branches of government and by the federal and state governments visà-vis each other.
President Roosevelt was not initially in favor of curtailing the
independence of the judiciary.226 In fact, at the outset of his presidency,

223. Id.
224. See generally Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme
Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV.
19 (1989) (discussing the power of judicial review by state courts).
225. Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest
State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 95 (1998); see also N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (“A
majority of the supreme court shall be necessary to constitute a quorum or to pronounce a
decision, provided that the supreme court shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional
unless at least four of the members of the court so decide.”); Tarr, supra note 208, at 607
(“[T]hree states—Nebraska, North Dakota, and Ohio—amended their constitutions to require
super-majority votes of their supreme courts to invalidate statutes.”).
226. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 83 (“I
had been brought up to hold the courts in especial reverence. The people with whom I was most
intimate were apt to praise the courts . . . and to speak of them as bulwarks against disorder and
barriers against demagogic legislation. These were the same people with whom the judges who
rendered these decisions were apt to foregather at social clubs, or dinners, or in private life. Very
naturally they all tended to look at things from the same standpoint. Of course it took more than
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Roosevelt had opposed initiatives such as establishing judicial recall and
abolishing judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation.227 He was
not unfamiliar with the potential for corruption among the judicial branch,
but chose to fight against it using traditional methods. For example, as the
youngest member of the New York state legislature, he railed against the
“ . . . unblushing corruption involving . . . a Judge of the Supreme Court.”228
Believing that “ . . . an unsullied judiciary was the ground fabric of
society[,]”229 Roosevelt called for removal of the judge through the
impeachment process.230 His efforts, however, were unsuccessful due to
the judge’s associations with “the notorious Jay Gould,”231 one of the most
powerful men in the United States.232
But when courts started striking down reformist laws—for example,
minimum wage laws, labor laws, and other progressive laws233—Roosevelt
switched his view and began to espouse judicial recall and curtailing the
power of judicial review.234 During the Progressive Era, concern rose to
preeminence over the rise of large corporations wielding inordinate power
over ordinary people, as well as over political parties and the government

one experience such as this Tenement Cigar Case to shake me out of the attitude in which I was
brought up.”).
227. See Carrington, supra note 225, at 94; William Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in
the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination,
and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967, 979 (2006) (“The idea of popular ‘recall’ of judicial decisions . . . was a
moderate alternative to judicial recall, which Roosevelt largely abjured, and to abolishing judicial
review, which he also opposed.”) (citation omitted).
228. JACOB A. RIIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE CITIZEN, 52-53 (The MacMillan
Company, 1918).
229. Id. at 54.
230. Id. at 54-55 (quoting “an unnamed writer in the ‘Saturday Evening Post,’ . . . ‘It was on
April 6, 1882, that young Roosevelt took the floor in the Assembly and demanded that Judge
Westbrook, of Newburg, be impeached.’”).
231. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, MORNINGS ON HORSEBACK, 260 (Simon and Schuster, 1981).
232. Id. at 260-66. For another account of this incident, see MORRIS, THEODORE REX,
supra note 35, at 175-81.
233. RIIS, supra note 228, at 60-61 (After hearing “[t]he bitter cry of the virtually enslaved
tenement cigarmakers . . . Roosevelt went to their rescue at once. He . . . went through the
tenements and saw for himself. The conditions he found made a profound impression upon
him. . . . He told the Legislature what he had seen, and a bill was passed to stop the evil, but it was
declared unconstitutional in the courts.”).
234. Talmage Boston, Feature: In the Arena: Theodore Roosevelt and the Law, 74 TEX. B.J.
508, 514 (2011) (“Like most presidents, Roosevelt wanted federal courts to rule and the
Constitution to be interpreted one way—his way. Unlike most presidents, when judges saw issues
differently than he did, Roosevelt believed they were purposefully betraying his trust. Small
wonder that after leaving the White House, as judgments and appellate opinions were rendered by
various courts against his desires, Roosevelt attempted to persuade the American electorate to vote
for the repeal of those errant decisions and for the immediate removal from the bench of the
judges who had authored them. Fortunately, Americans rejected Roosevelt’s pitch for personal
power over the rule of law.”).
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itself.235 Progressives, such as Roosevelt, called upon the legislative branch
to resolve social problems, including those caused by the rise of large
unregulated corporations, only to see the successful law reform efforts
thwarted by courts willing to strike down such legislation as
unconstitutional.236 For example, the New York Court of Appeals struck
down a law Roosevelt had championed that would have alleviated the
horrific conditions under which the “virtually enslaved”237 workers in New
York tenements labored.238 In his autobiography, Roosevelt noted that
“[t]his decision completely blocked tenement-house reform legislation in
New York for a score of years. . . . It was one of the most serious setbacks
which the cause of industrial and social progress and reform ever
received.”239
The progressives questioned the courts’ ability to invalidate legislation
that was duly enacted by the legislative branch and signed into law by the
executive branch.240 More specifically, they questioned the ability of the
courts to wield constitutional provisions, whether in federal or state courts,
to strike down statutes that the public wanted—and that their duly elected
representatives had enacted—that would have promoted justice and fairness
for average citizens.241 Are not each of the three branches of government
supposed to be co-equal branches of government, so that no one branch was
more powerful than any of the others? How then, could the courts—often
considered to be the least democratic branch of government, because they

235. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 975
(“How could ‘We the People’ rule in the face of the rise of the large-scale corporation and the
asymmetries of wealth, power, and organization it produced? How could it contend with corporate
domination of the nation’s political parties and legislatures?”).
236. Peter Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative Politicians
as Chief Judicial Reformers, 1975 SUPREME CT. REV. 123, 125 (1975) (“Theodore Roosevelt . . .
numbered among the conservative reformers’ chief antagonists. Such social progressives looked
to government to ameliorate defects in the fabric of society. But often they looked in vain as
courts, particularly federal courts, struck down or otherwise emasculated legislative efforts to
meet new industrial conditions. To progressives the ‘activist’ superlegislative role of judges in
construing constitutions and statutes in a manner according extensive protection to corporate
property ranked as their fundamental objection to the judiciary.”).
237. RIIS, supra note 228, at 60.
238. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 82.
239. Id. at 83.
240. THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 508.
241. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 83
(“[V]arious decisions, not only of the New York court but of certain other State courts and even of
the United States Supreme Court, during the quarter of a century following the passage of this
tenement-house legislation, did at last thoroughly wake me. . . . I grew to realize that all that . . .
could be said with equal truth and justice about the numerous decisions which in our own day
were erected as bars across the path of social reform, and which brought to naught so much of the
effort to secure justice and fair dealing for workingmen and workingwomen, and for plain citizens
generally.”).
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are supposed to be insulated from political pressures—tell the other
branches of government what they can and cannot do? This, the
progressive reformers believed, was a particularly irksome problem—and
particularly the courts’ faulty interpretation and application of the U.S.
Constitution, according to the reformers’ beliefs.242 The progressives were
angry with the courts for exerting the power of judicial review to invalidate
the actions of the legislative and executive branches that would have
ameliorated the conditions of the poor as against the rich who exploited
them.243
Roosevelt felt that the courts were purportedly handing down
principled decisions by wielding the power of judicial review to strike down
progressive legislation as unconstitutional, but that they were actually
engaged in making policy decisions.244 He felt that these were activist
judges furtively inventing constitutional interpretations that they could use
to prevent progressive legislation throughout states with reform-minded
legislatures.245 Roosevelt felt this situation was intolerable—that people
who fundamentally want to prevent change are using this constitutional
doctrine as a way to defeat progressive legislation.246 These judges could
not be removed by the process of impeachment, so he lead the fight to
implement measures to override the judges, such as judicial recall, so the

242. Id. at 478-79 (Roosevelt indicated, “[n]ot only some of the Federal judges, but some of
the State courts invoked the Constitution in a spirit of the narrowest legalistic obstruction to
prevent the Government from acting in defense of labor on inter-State railways.”).
243. Id. at 473 (“The judge who by word or deed makes it plain that the corrupt corporation,
the law-defying corporation, the law-defying rich man, has in him a sure and trustworthy ally, the
judge who by misuse of the process of injunction makes it plain that in him the wage-worker has a
determined and unscrupulous enemy, the judge who when he decides in an employers’ liability or
a tenement house factory case shows that he has neither sympathy for nor understanding of those
fellow-citizens of his who most need his sympathy and understanding; these judges work as much
evil as if they pandered to the mob, as if they shrank from sternly repressing violence and
disorder.”).
244. Id. at 82 (“[T]he courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done to
better social and industrial conditions.”).
245. Id. at 438 (“The courts, not unnaturally, but most regrettably, and to the grave
detriment of the people and of their own standing, had for a quarter of a century been on the whole
the agents of reaction, and by conflicting decisions which, however, in their sum were hostile to
the interests of the people, had left both the nation and the several States well-nigh impotent to
deal with the great business combinations.”).
246. Id. (“Sometimes [the courts] forbade the Nation to interfere, because such interference
trespassed on the rights of the States; sometimes they forbade the States to interfere (and often
they were wise in this), because to do so would trespass on the rights of the Nation; but always, or
well-nigh always, their action was negative action against the interests of the people, ingeniously
devised to limit their power against wrong, instead of affirmative action giving to the people the
power to right wrong.”).
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worst of these obstructionists could be neutralized and no longer impede the
progressive agenda.247
Therefore, during his presidency, Roosevelt began expressing
frustration with the courts and advocating the need to curtail their power.248
After 1910, Roosevelt began to speak about judicial recall, because he
believed that the courts were frustrating his progressive political
program.249 Roosevelt felt that some of the men who served as judges at
the turn of the century were habitually staunch conservatives—reactionaries
who could not be trusted—and were holding back the progressive
movement in this country.250 Therefore, he sought to establish mechanisms
to avoid letting these perceived intransigents deny the will of the people for
progressive reforms.251
Roosevelt particularly advocated for state constitutional reform to
allow for the procedures of popular override of judicial decisions.252 This
type of judicial referendum describes a procedure undertaken when the
populace is displeased with a particular judicial decision, so that decision is
put to a vote and the general population can overturn that decision.253

247. THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 507-11.
248. Edward Hartnett, Why is the Supreme Court of the United States Protecting State
Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 907, 934 (1997) (“As president, Roosevelt
‘had been critical of the judiciary for blocking social legislation and was convinced that no
comprehensive program of reform could be achieved unless the courts could be curbed.’”)
(citation omitted).
249. Id. at 935 (“Roosevelt proposed a way to reverse such cases: recall of judicial
decisions, an idea that took shape during 1911. In the summer of that year, when the admission of
Arizona to the Union was under consideration, Roosevelt criticized President Taft for opposing
the provision in the Arizona Constitution for recall of judges.”) (citation omitted).
250. THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 9, at 438 (“[The courts] had
rendered these decisions sometimes as upholders of property rights against human rights, being
especially zealous in securing the rights of the very men who were most competent to take care of
themselves; and sometimes in the name of liberty, in the name of the so-called ‘new freedom,’ in
reality the old, old ‘freedom,’ which secured to the powerful the freedom to prey on the poor and
the helpless.”).
251. THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 507-11.
252. Hartnett, supra note 248, at 935 (“In November of 1911, after Judge Learned Hand had
expressed concern that Roosevelt’s writing would be construed as a dangerous invitation to exert
popular pressure on judges, Roosevelt wrote to Hand: ‘Evidently I must try to make my
expression more clear. I absolutely agree with you as to bringing pressure to bear on the judges,
but in Constitutional cases the alternative must be to have the right of appeal from the judges.
Take the New York cases to which I refer. My idea would be to have the Constitutional
Convention provide that the people shall have the right to vote as to whether or not the judges’
interpretation of the law in such a case is correct, and that their vote shall be decisive.’”) (citation
omitted).
253. The term “judicial referendum” can also refer to a process by which voters cast and up
or down vote on judicial incumbents in a regularly scheduled election, as opposed to holding
contested elections. See Blair T. O’Connor, Note, Want to Limit Congressional Terms? Vote for
“None of the Above”, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 361, 402-03 (1997).
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Roosevelt also considered the possibility of abolishing the practice of
judicial review in state courts, thereby not allowing state judges or justices
to declare a law unconstitutional if it was popularly voted upon and
approved by the branches of government that were elected by the people.254
The progressive reformers perceived that the problem with the courts was
that judges were hostile to legislative efforts to ameliorate the concerns of
laborers and the working poor who were being exploited by the new,
wealthy, and powerful corporate interests.255 State courts continued to
strike down progressive legislation using the state and federal constitutions
as a sword.256
In response, movements across the country arose to attempt to curb the
power of judges. Part of these efforts were to put into place mechanisms
allowing for judicial recall. Considering these mechanisms, Roosevelt
emphatically stated:
Massachusetts has the right to have appointive judges who serve
during good behavior, subject to removal, not by impeachment,
but by simple majority vote of the two houses of the Legislature
whenever the representatives of the people feel that the needs of
the people require such removal. . . . I prefer the Massachusetts
[approach].257
Some states adopted constitutional provisions allowing for recall of
judges and other elected officials.258 Other states attempted to limit judicial
power by instituting referenda over judicial decisions.259 This was a call for
popular democracy over the independence of the judicial branch.260 Of
course, this was part of the overall Progressive Party’s push toward the
direct primary, the initiative, referendum, and recall, as well as a
constitutional amendment to make it easier to amend the U.S.

254. THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 282.
255. Fish, supra note 236, at 125.
256. Hartnett, supra note 248, at 935-36 (“Again and again in the past justice has been
scandalously obstructed by State courts declaring State laws in conflict with the Federal
Constitution, although the Supreme Court of the nation had never so decided or had even decided
in a contrary sense.”).
257. Theodore Roosevelt, A Charter of Democracy, Address Before the Ohio Constitutional
Convention (Feb. 21, 1912), http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/txtspeeches/
704.pdf.
258. Carrington, supra note 225, at 94 (“Seven states adopted constitutional provisions for
the recall of elected officers, including judges, a proposal horrifying to political conservatives
professing to cherish the independence of the judiciary from political intimidation.”) (citation
omitted).
259. Id. at 94 (“Colorado took a different step, providing in its constitution for review by
referendum of judicial decisions.”).
260. Fish, supra note 236, at 125.
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Constitution.261 The 1912 Progressive Party Platform called for “such
restriction of the power of the courts as shall leave to the people the
ultimate authority to determine fundamental questions of social welfare and
public policy.”262 In 1912, Roosevelt espoused that “the judge is just as
much the servant of the people as any other official.”263 He advocated that
the people should have the final decision-making authority as to
constitutional matters, and therefore, should have the ability to overturn
judicial decisions on constitutional cases by popular referendum.264
As a result of being outraged by the decision of New York’s highest
court to abrogate the state’s mandatory worker’s compensation statute,
Roosevelt supported an amendment to the New York constitution that
would allow for the people to overturn by referendum judicial decisions on
the constitutionality of legislation.265 The court had held that the worker’s
compensation statute, which provided that employers would be liable for
injuries to employees on the job, was unconstitutional under both the
federal and state constitutions.266 Roosevelt responded: “It is out of the
question . . . that the courts should be permitted permanently to shackle our
hands as they would shackle them by decisions such as this.”267
However, even Roosevelt’s supporters questioned the wisdom of his
approach out of concern that the use of popular referenda in determining the

261. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 97778.
262. Fish, supra note 236, at 125 (citing The Progressive Party Platform of 1912, in THE
PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: 1900-1915, 129-30 (Hofstadter, ed., 1965)).
263. Id. at 126 (quoting HENRY F. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A BIOGRAPHY 558
(1931)).
264. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 979
(“[H]igh court decisions ought to be subject to review by the people through referendum. ‘If any
considerable number of the people feel’ that a constitutional decision ‘is in defiance of justice’ or
misjudges the proper bounds of the state’s police power, ‘they should be given the right by
petition to bring that decision before the voters’; a progressive state constitution must ‘permit the
people themselves by popular vote, after due deliberation and discussion, but finally and without
appeal, to settle what the proper construction of any Constitutional point is.’”) (citing Roosevelt, A
Charter of Democracy, supra note 257); see also THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 114, at 119 (“[T]here is no justification for refusing to give the people the real, and not
merely the nominal, ultimate decision on questions of constitutional law.”).
265. Carrington, supra note 225, at 94-95 (“He proposed for New York the Colorado
provision allowing a right of appeal to the people through a referendum on the constitutionality of
legislation.”).
266. Id. (“Disregarding social and economic data depicting the oppression of labor, the court
held that employers were guaranteed the right by both federal and state constitutions to employ
workers without taking responsibility for their work-related injuries.”).
267. Id. at 95 (citing Workmen’s Compensation, 98 THE OUTLOOK 49 (May 13, 1911); see
also Theodore Roosevelt, Introduction, in WILLIAM L. RANSOM, MAJORITY RULE AND THE
JUDICIARY: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AFFECTING THE RELATIONS OF COURTS TO LEGISLATION, 3-24 (1912).
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constitutionality of statutes may not be advisable.268 For example, his close
friend, Henry Cabot Lodge, strongly opposed Roosevelt’s position, which
irreparably tarnished their longstanding friendship.269 This is another area
where a stark contrast can be seen between President Taft and President
Roosevelt. This stance diminished Roosevelt’s chances in the 1912
presidential election.270 Roosevelt’s detractors, such as William Howard
Taft, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, and others, were worried that he was
attempting to undermine the rule of law.271 The American public had not
fully embraced popular constitutionalism and has been wary of popular
control over the judiciary or judicial decision-making.272 Therefore, even
many who supported the progressive platform feared having the general
population be able to overrule a decision of the courts and impose their own
interpretation of the constitution.273 The founding fathers created the U.S.
Constitution and framework of government via the three coequal branches
of government—they intentionally fractured the government.274 They did
not want to reinstitute the tyranny they had experienced under King George,

268. Carrington, supra note 225, at 94 (“Even Learned Hand, though a devoted follower of
Roosevelt, thought ill of this idea as a perversion of the judicial role in constitutional
adjudication.”).
269. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 980
(“Even Henry Cabot Lodge, who owed Roosevelt his reelection to the Senate in 1911, now wrote
his lifelong friend that he could not support his quest for the White House: ‘I found myself
confronted with the fact that I was opposed to your policies declared at Columbus [at the Ohio
Constitutional Convention] with great force in regard to changes in our Constitution and principles
of government. . . . I knew of course that you and I differed on some of these points but I had not
realized that the difference was so wide.’”).
270. Carrington, supra note 225, at 94; see also Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the
Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 979 (“[O]f all the innovations in “the machinery of
government” that Roosevelt championed, the “recall of state judicial decisions” proved most
controversial. His bold statement of the people’s interpretive authority hobbled Roosevelt’s
chance of securing the Republican nomination.”).
271. Hartnett, supra note 248, at 937-38.
272. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 968
(“When matters came to a head, [Americans] embraced only halfway the counsel and vision of
Progressives like Theodore Roosevelt who looked to undo judicial finality, dethrone the courts,
and institute a new democratic allocation of interpretive authority. . . . Popular sway over
constitutional questions in both eras stood in tension with a deeply conservative current of popular
skepticism about the people’s collective enthusiasms about the uses of state power, a current that
ran in favor of judicial finality.”).
273. Hartnett, supra note 248, at 942 (“The platform, however, did not endorse Roosevelt’s
recall proposal but instead called for a less radical method of reversing state court decisions
invalidating state statutes on federal constitutional grounds, which had been proposed by the
American Bar Association: review of such a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States.
It appears that not all Progressives shared Roosevelt’s ‘distrust and suspicion of the judiciary.’”)
(citations omitted).
274. Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., & Arminda Bepko, A Necessary and Proper Role for Federal
Courts in Prison Reform: The Benjamin V. Malcom Consent Decrees, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 3,
6-7 (2007-2008).
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so they separated the branches of government and separated the federal and
state governments as well, providing many checks and balances between all
of these separate entities.275 The legislature would pass the laws, which the
president would either sign or veto.276 The judiciary was supposed to be the
independent branch—to be the neutral arbiter.277 Thus, when parties come
before a judge, multiple safeguards have been put into place allowing the
judge to be neutral and not subject to the will of the people in determining
the case. Particularly in the federal system, the judges and justices are
appointed by the president and approved by a majority of the Senate.278
Once federal judges are in office, they are appointed for life, presuming
good behavior.279 No Supreme Court justice and very few lower court
judges have ever been removed through the impeachment process;280
therefore, Congress cannot realistically use the threat of impeachment to
sway judges against making unpopular decisions. Both the perception and
hopefully the fact of neutrality have been built into the federal judicial
system, to protect it from being buffeted by political winds or the caprice of
the populace.
Roosevelt’s attempt to curtail the independence of the judiciary was
one of the factors that cost him his friendship with Henry Cabot Lodge and
Elihu Root, as well as his relationship with William Taft.281 Many of
Roosevelt’s supporters felt that his position on these issues was particularly
unwise.282 It lost him a great deal of support in the Progressive Party and in

275. Eric J. McDonald Guadalupe, Double Jeopardy, Dual Sovereignty, and Other Legal
Fictions, 28 REV. JURIDICA U. INTER. P.R. 201, 218 (1994) (“A strong central government, like
foreign alliances, was viewed with suspicion. The experiences of the founding fathers had forged
this mind set. The American revolution was less a war for civil liberties than one fought against a
distant and strong centralized government. To many legal scholars of that time, the States, not the
People, had replaced King George III as the Sovereign. It was these same Sovereigns that had
convened in Philadelphia in 1789 to forge a new compact.”).
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, §. 7, cl. 2-3.
277. See generally Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, The Case for Independence: Why Should
We Care About Independent and Accountable Judges?, 61-APR OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 10 (2001).
278. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
279. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
280. Joel B. Grossman & David A. Yalof, The Day After: Do We Need A “Twenty-Eighth
Amendment?”, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 7 (2000); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 31 (19th ed. 2016) (“No Supreme Court Justice has ever been removed
under that provision”); Gideon Mark, SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 45, 100 n.381 (2016) (noting that only “fifteen Article III judges were impeached
during the period 1803-2010”) (citation omitted).
281. Talmage Boston, Review of in the Arena: Theodore Roosevelt and the Law, 74 TEX. B.
J. 508, 511-12 (2011).
282. Hartnett, supra note 248, at 934-43.
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his campaign in 1912 to seek reelection to the presidency against President
Taft, and it contributed to his loss during that election.283
Both judicial recall and judicial referendum are anathema to people
who are concerned about preserving the independence of the judiciary. The
two lawmaking branches of government, the legislature (which passes the
bills) and the executive (which signs the bills into law and ensures that they
are carried out) are elected by the people and subject to the will of the
people.284 These are the political branches of government, meaning that by
structural design, both are intended to be responsive to popular will and are
influenced greatly by politics, the political parties, media, polling, and so
on. By contrast, the judicial branch of government was intended by the
framers—at least at the federal level—to be independent and not to be
influenced by the whims of the populace.285 Judges are supposed to be
neutral adjudicators who interpret and apply the law in a fair and impartial
manner, and who are not unduly swayed in their decisions by outside
forces, such as popular opinion. Instead, federal judges are nominated by
the president and appointed to the judiciary with the advice and consent of
the Senate.286 Although that process is also influenced by politics, it is
perceived to be less so than elections.287 Moreover, federal judges are
appointed for life as long as they maintain good behavior,288 which makes a
tremendous difference in their ability to maintain both the perception and

283. Id.
284. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1-2; art. 2, § 1.
285. David K. Stott, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality
Through Recusal Reform, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 481, 484 (2009) (“In the eighteenth century, the
framers of federal and state constitutions firmly believed in creating a bench sanitized from the
democratic whims of the people, and early methods of judicial selection emphasized this principle.
Perhaps because they viewed British judges as mere puppets of the King, the Framers of the
United States Constitution made judicial independence the bedrock principle of Article III.”)
(citation omitted).
286. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
287. Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selection Process in
the United States, 75 MICH. B. J. 904, 904-05 (1996) (“Four primary methods are used to select
judges in the United States: gubernatorial appointment, gubernatorial appointment with retention
election, partisan election and nonpartisan election. Three states select judges by legislative
appointment or election. Three states fill unexpired terms by Supreme Court appointment. The
gubernatorial appointment without a retention election most closely emulates the federal system of
judicial selection. U.S. District Court judges are appointed by the executive (the president), with
consent of the Senate, for life. . . . The very nature of periodic elections is to give the electorate an
opportunity to directly either select or reject judges. Gubernatorial appointment without a
retention election removes the electorate from directly influencing the judicial selection process.
Judicial selection becomes a function of elected representatives of the people.”) (citations
omitted).
288. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
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the reality of independence.289 Although judges are appointed by presidents
with a particular political stance, believing that the judges they appoint also
reflect that stance, once in office, with the guarantees of independence
brought by lifetime tenure, the judges or justices will sometimes adopt
positions that starkly diverge from that of the president who appointed
them.290
By contrast, judicial recall would subject judges directly to popular
291
will.
Therefore, as previously described, judges would more likely be
responsive to popular opinion in deciding each case or face the possibility
of being recalled from office. Having the possibility of judicial recall
looming over one’s head is even more onerous than facing periodic judicial
elections, where people vote on aggregate of decisions, not immediately in
reaction to one highly unpopular decision that can trigger a recall campaign.
Judicial referendum would subject the outcome of particular cases to
popular will, in effect enabling the general population to sit in judgment of
two parties in a lawsuit.292
More moderate reformers, such as then-President William Taft,
emphatically opposed Roosevelt’s position. This assault on the courts

289. David McLean, Judicial Tenure in Vermont: Does Good Behavior Merit Retention?,
27-MAR VT. B. J. 39 (2001) (“Federal judges have independence secured by lifetime tenure
during good behavior and a salary guaranteed not to diminish during that time. The federal
provisions provide the greatest possible independence for judges, at least as compared to other
likely selection and tenure options. Lifetime appointments mean that judges do not have to worry
about currying the favor of an executive officer, appointing committee, or the general public when
deciding cases. A secure salary provision makes it impossible for the legislature to reduce a
judge’s salary as means of expressing disapproval over a specific decision. In addition,
appointment as a means of putting judges on the bench increases independence because judges are
not dependent on popular opinion in order to obtain a position. In contrast, popular elections
decrease independence by turning judges into politicians, creating the possibility that thoughts of
winning the next election may enter the decision calculus in cases that catch the public eye.”)
(citation omitted).
290. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 280, at 30-31 (“It has long been accepted that the
President may choose nominees who share his ideological views.”); James J. Brudney, Foreseeing
Greatness: Measurable Performance Criteria and the Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2005) (“Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun . . . were nominated
for the Supreme Court by the same President, who had made clear that he wanted new members of
the Court to reflect a certain judicial philosophy. As Supreme Court Justices, however, Burger
and Blackmun came to differ sharply in their doctrinal and ideological orientation.”) (citation
omitted).
291. See, e.g., THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 106 (“We wish to
see the people the masters of the court not to overthrow the Constitution but to overthrow those
who have perverted the Constitution into an antisocial fetich [sic], used to prevent our securing
laws to protect the ordinary working man and working woman in their rights.”); see also id. at 119
(quoting Roosevelt’s approval of judicial recall in certain instances).
292. See, e.g., THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 119 (“The safe way
to prevent popular discontent with the courts from becoming acute and chronic, is to provide the
people with the simple, direct, effective, and yet limited power to secure the interpretation of their
own constitution in accordance with their own deliberate judgment.”).
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offended Taft, who was a leading advocate for independence of the
judiciary.293 Taft, who served as president between 1909-1913, revered
judges and the judiciary.294 In fact, Taft advocated for judicial reform of
the laws as a more effective and efficient way to achieve needed changes in
the law than simply relying on legislatures,295 and he zealously worked to
preserve the independence of the judiciary throughout his tenure as
President.296 He believed that judges must be insulated from popular
caprice and political pressure. Therefore, he supported judicial structures
favoring independence, such as an appointment process rather than direct
elections for judges and lifetime tenure during good behavior.297 Taft was
vehemently opposed to elections for judges, the adoption of provisions for
judicial recall, the adoption of referendum processes to overturn judicial
decisions by popular vote, and other so-called reforms that would curb the
ability of judges to decide cases based upon merit than upon the whims of
the people.298 Taft was concerned that “law would become dependent ‘on
the momentary passions of a people,’ expressed via initiative, referenda,
and recall of judicial officials and decisions.”299 His aim for reforming the
courts, and the aim of other conservative reformers, was to address the
concern that the courts were too “slow, costly, and inefficient.”300 His faith
in the judicial system served him well, as he ultimately became the tenth
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, serving between July 1921 and
February 1930.301

293. Hartnett, supra note 248, at 938-39 (“Roosevelt’s position on judges stood in stark
contrast to that of the incumbent President Taft, who in August of 1911 had vetoed statehood for
Arizona because its constitution permitted the recall of judges. Taft once said, ‘I love judges, and
I love courts. . . . They are my ideals, that typify on earth what we shall meet hereafter in heaven
under a just God.’ He believed what his father had told him, that ‘to be Chief Justice is more than
to be President,’ but sought the Presidency largely at his wife’s urging. As President, Taft
‘remained a jurist in a political office.’ He ‘idolized the court system as the greatest protector of
property rights and needed brake on democracy, and looked upon its critics as anarchists or
communists.’ Roosevelt’s speech advocating recall of judicial decisions ‘greatly alarmed
President Taft and solidified his intention to go down fighting.’”) (citation omitted).
294. Id.
295. Carrington, supra note 225, at 93 (“He advocated judicial law reform for the purpose of
reducing cost and delay, urging that reforms of that sort would better serve the interests of
disadvantaged citizens encountering difficulty in enforcing their rights than would an enlargement
of their substantive entitlements.”).
296. Id. at 94 (“As President, he invested much of his energy and political capital in
resisting law reforms aiming to hold judges accountable to an electorate.”).
297. Fish, supra note 236, at 126.
298. Id. at 128.
299. Id. (citing HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: A
BIOGRAPHY 766 (1939)).
300. Id. at 125.
301. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice: My Life in the Law Series, 52
DUKE L.J. 787, 798 (2003).
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Moreover, confidence began to wane in the wise deliberation of the
popular vote that underpinned the movement toward each of the progressive
governmental reforms—direct democracy through the initiative, recall,
referendum, direct primaries, and an easier constitutional amendment
process.302 The rise of mass advertising and propaganda machineries
during World War I gave rise to the concern that the will of the people
would be manufactured and manipulated by moneyed interests and eroded
support for direct democracy movements.303 And of course, Woodrow
Wilson, who advocated for a more moderate progressivism within the
current constitutional structure, won the 1912 election, defeating both
Roosevelt and Taft.304
Judicial review is still alive and well, because Roosevelt’s attempts to
curb the court’s ability to uphold the U.S. Constitution against conflicting
statutes did not prevail. Given the recurring attacks on the Supreme Court
and the federal and state judiciaries, with some activists calling for ways to
bring the courts more in keeping with their own political proclivities, it is
interesting to examine the parallels with Roosevelt’s time.305
VI. CONCLUSION
President Theodore Roosevelt achieved great accomplishments
throughout the course of his career in public service, endearing himself to
many. 306 His massive personality, charisma, and energy enabled him to
create sweeping changes in the operation and integrity of both state and

302. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 98283.
303. Id. (“The war saw the creation of massive propaganda machinery by the federal
government in collaboration with the emerging advertising industry. In the ‘20s both experienceswar-time propaganda and burgeoning ‘modern’ advertising-inspired thinkers like Walter Lippman
to forge a new conception of modern, urban publics-as manipulable, irrational, ‘emotional’ vessels
for opinions ‘manufactured’ for them by media and political technicians. Thus, the idea of ‘public
opinion’ underwent a sea change. From meaning the considered views of the citizenry, which
must guide and constrain state policy and constitutional development, and from being a project of
progressive reformers, intellectuals and activists, ‘public opinion’ became the product of new
professionals and new techniques: advertising, polling, mass media. And the pre-war Progressive
ideas about democratic citizenship and popular rule came to seem hopelessly naive.”).
304. Id. at 983.
305. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Referendum Results Are No End to the Battles:
Public perception, ambivalence fuel anger with judiciary, 5 No. 45 ABA J. E-REPORT 1 (2006).
306. RIIS, supra note 228, at 268-69 (“As I am writing this now, there comes to mind really
the finest compliment I ever heard paid him, and quite unintentionally. The lady who said it was
rather disappointed, it seemed. She was looking for some great hero in whom to embody all her
high ideals, and, said she, ‘I always wanted to make Roosevelt out that; but, somehow, every time
he did something that seemed really great it turned out, upon looking at it closely, that it was only
just the right thing to do.’ I would not want a finer thing said of me when my work is done. . . .
And it comes as near as anything could to putting him just right.”).
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federal governments, particularly impacting the nation’s natural
resources.307 Although he did not achieve everything he set out to
accomplish (such as ensconcing popular will over the judiciary), his
tremendous expansion of presidential power through the use of executive
orders helped reshape the relationship between Congress and the executive
branch that has endured to the present day. His legacy helps to inform the
current debates about the appropriate role of the executive and legislative
branches at the federal level.

307. As his presidency came to a close, “for millions of contemporary Americans, he was
already memorialized in the eighteen national monuments and five national parks he had created
by executive order, or cajoled out of Congress. The ‘inventory,’ . . . included protected pinnacles,
a crater lake, a rain forest and a petrified forest, a wind cave and a jewel cave, cliff dwellings, a
cinder cone and skyscraper of hardened magma, sequoia stands, glacier meadows, and the
grandest of all canyons.” MORRIS, THEODORE REX, supra note 35, at 554.

